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NOTES
Antitrust Law-A Rocky Road for Price Discrimination In North
Carolina
In Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co.1 the North Carolina Supreme
Court was given its first opportunity to apply North Carolina antitrust
law to price discrimination. The relationship of the parties involved,
however, partially obscured the problems of price discrimination. Normally, price discrimination pits the government or the victim of the discrimination against the discriminating seller. In Rose -thefavored buyer demanded damages from the seller because of the seller's failure
to perform the contract which created the discrimination.
T. W. Rose and J. E. Dooley, owners of the only rock quarries in a
three county area,2 executed two agreements in January 1959 for the sale
of crushed stone. Under the first agreement' Dooley received a tenyear lease on the Rose quarry. He was not required to operate that
quarry, and in fact, he never mined any stone. Besides a two-cents per
ton royalty on all stone taken from the leased quarry, Rose was to receive a price advantage on two types of gravel extracted from the leased
mine: twenty-five cents per ton on crusherrun stone and twenty cents
per ton on clean concrete stone.
The second agreement gave Rose
similar ten-year price advantages and these differentials were to be
applied to Rose's purchases from the quarry owned by Dooley.4
1. 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973).
2. Record, vol. 15, at 35, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C. App. 695, 190
S.E.2d 719 (1972).
3. The agreement relative to the Rose quarry specified:
Should the tenant decide to operate the above mentioned quarry he agrees
to sell stone to [plaintiff] F.O.B. this quarry for the following prices:
Crushed run stone at $1.45 per ton
Clean Concrete stone at $1.80 per ton
#11 stone at $2.20 per ton
The tenant further agrees that he will not sell any stone produced at this
quarry to anyone other than the Highway Commission for a price less than
the following:
Crushed Run stone at $1.70 per ton
# 11 stone at $2.20 per ton
Clean Concrete stone at $2.00 per ton
282 N.C. 643, 647, 194 S.E.2d 521, 525 (1973).
4. Another agreement gave similar terms on price for operation of the Dooley
quarry:
Witnesseth, that the seller agrees to furnish the buyer stone F.O.B. the
quarry site at Cycle, North Carolina at the following prices:
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Vulcan Materials Company assumed the contracts with Rose after
it had purchased the Dooley firm. In May 1961 Vulcan informed Rose
that it was equalizing prices to all customers because of buyer discontent and the company's fear of liability.5 Rose protested but paid the
higher price, claiming there was no alternative source of supply.6
When the agreements expired, Rose brought suit for the difference be-

tween the higher price demanded by Vulcan and the contract price.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, reversing a superior court
ruling for Rose, found that the contracts violated both federal and state
antitrust laws' and, thus, could not be enforced. The North Carolina
Supreme Court, however, held that the court of appeals had incorrectly

interpreted the applicable laws and therefore reversed in favor of Rose.
In analyzing the alleged statutory violations, the supreme court
first held that the price discrimination portion of the Robinson-Patman
Act' did not apply because the defendant had failed to show that any
sale had occurred in interstate commerce.) Turning to state law, the
Crusher run stone at $1.25 per ton
Clean Concrete stone at 1.60 per ton
No. 11 stone at 2.00 per ton...
J. E. Dooley & Son, Inc., agree that they will not sell any stone to anyone
other than the State Highway Commission for prices less than the following
from the Cycle Quarry:
Crusher run stone $1.50 per ton
Clean Concrete stone 1.80 per ton
No. 11 stone at 2.00 per ton
The above restrictions shall apply only to an area of an eight mile radius
of Elkin, North Carolina and shall apply for a period of ten years from the
date of this contract.
Id. at 648, 194 S.E.2d at 525.
5. Record, vol. 15, at 68, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C. App. 695, 190
S.E.2d 719 (1972).
6. Id. at 53.
7. Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C. App. 695, 698, 190 S.E.2d 719, 721
(1972).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (a) (1970).
9. The Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), has two jurisdictional prerequisites: (1) the seller must be engaged in interstate commerce; and (2) a discrimination in price must result from the conduct of such interstate commerce. Interpretation
of the second requirement has been uncertain since the Supreme Court decision of
Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). Moore implied that resources
acquired in interstate commerce that are used to finance intrastate discriminations would
satisfy the "course of commerce" requirement. Like the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Rose, however, most of the federal courts of appeals have consistently required
proof of a discriminatory interstate sale. See, e.g., Kitner & Mayne, Interstate Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 58 Gao. LJ.
1117 (1970). See also Note, The Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-PatmanAct,
22 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (1971).
The unsettled nature of this issue was demonstrated in Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co.,
456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1972). The three-judge panel ruled that an interstate sale was
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supreme court ruled that section 75-5(b)(5) of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which had been applied by the court of appeals, did not
cover the conduct of the parties. 10 Since this provision prohibits geographic discriminations that injure competitors of the seller and since
the proven injuries were only to competitors of the buyer, the court held
that the statute was inapplicable.
The supreme court also rejected the argument that the agreements
were "restraints of trade" under section 75-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes.11 After tracing the history of competitive restraints, the
court concluded that all restrictions not condemned at common law were
to be tested for their unreasonableness. The supreme court further held
that, if particular offenses were not analyzed by the common law courts,
the burden of proving unreasonableness rests on the party asserting illegality. Since price discrimination had not been subjected to commonlaw review, Vulcan was found to have the burden of proof. However,
the court found that Vulcan had failed to satisfy this requirement. The
not required. This decision received mixed "reviews" from commentators. Compare
Note, Robinson-PatmanAct: "In Commerce" JurisdictionalRequirement Broadened, 57
MINN. L. REV. 1035 (1973), ivith 86 HAnv. L. REv. 765 (1973). The Fifth Circuit,
sitting en banc, reversed the initial decision. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d
1140 (5th Cir. 1973). The Tenth Circuit also has rejected this principle. Continental
Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 109 (10th Cir. 1973). Although
the rule is not absolute, the requirement of an interstate sale will probably remain in
force until specifically changed by the United States Supreme Court.
10. 282 N.C. at 653-55, 194 S.E.2d at 529. Interpretation of section 75-5(b) (5)
demands a careful reading of the statute.
(b) In addition to the other acts declared unlawful by this chapter, it
is unlawful for any person directly or indirectly to do, or to have any contract
express or knowingly implied to do, any of the following acts:
(5) While engaged in dealing in goods within this State, at a place where
there is competition, to sell such goods at a price lower than is charged
by such person for the same thing at another place, when there is not good
and sufficient reason on account of transportation or the expense of doing
business for charging less at one place than at the other, or to give away
such goods, with a view to injuring the business of another.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(5) (1965). The most important limitation on this provision is a result of legislative drafting: the General Assembly described all of the prohibited activities with reference only to the verb "to sell." The statute therefore applies
only to sellers. The same construction is encountered in the Robinson-Patman Act, and
the limitation to sellers has been held constitutional. United States v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (constitutional attacks on vagueness and due process
dismissed).
Further wording limits the general usefulness of section 75-5(b)(5) even for sellers. Price discrimination traditionally has required two sales; however, this provision
requires two sales in two different regions. Therefore the statute is directed more at
locality discriminations than at general forms of price discrimination. See CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 17031 (West 1964), applied in Harris v. Capital Records Distnb.
Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 454, 413 P.2d 139, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1966).
11. 282 N.C. at 657-58, 194 S.E.2d at 531.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

court added that even if the pricing agreements were in violation of
sections 75-1 and 75-5(b)(7),12 the decision would not have been
changed because the illegal price to other customers could have been sev-

ered from the legal price to Rose.' 3 The contract was therefore enforceable and the trial court's judgment for damages was reinstated.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION

A prerequisite for evaluating the Rose decision is an understanding of price discrimination, the most complicated trade restraint. Only

a simplistic explanation is possible here. 14 The condemned activities
involve transactions by a seller which "discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality""' and
which economically injure another buyer or seller. Price discrimination,

however, does not depend solely on a price differential. Ifthe difference in prices charged to various customers reflects decreased marketing and production costs or competition, the discrimination is lawful.' 0
This special price, however, must be available to all customers practically as well as theoretically. 7

The price differential is illegal when

it is the extension of favoritism, a result of competitive power or resources.
The economic nature of the pricing agreements, therefore, is ex12. See note 44 infra.
13. 282 N.C. at 658, 194 S.E.2d at 531.
14. The complexity of price discrimination has produced innumerable evaluations.
Numerous simple explanations can be found; e.g., C. AUSTIN, PRicE DISCRIMINATION
AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT (2d rev. ed. 1959); D.
BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Act (1964). More extensive evaluations are also available; e.g., C. EDWARDS, THE PRrCE DISCRIMINATION LAW (1959); F. ROWE, PRICE DIsCRIMINATION UNDER TmE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT (1962) (best general authority), Special sources exist even for pragmatic applications of the act; e.g., A. SAWYER, BUSINEsS
Asprs OF PRIcING UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Act (1963). Other commentators
feel that the problems involved in interpreting price discrimination outweigh the benefits
of attacking the violation. E.g., Austern, Presumptions and Percipience About Competitive Effect Under Section 2 of the Clayton Act, 81 HARv. L. REv. 773 (1968).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
16. C. EDWARDS, supra note 14, at 546-616 (a detailed examination of the major
defenses to charges of price discrimination); Mayer, Affirmative Defenses to Prima
Facie Violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 310 (1966).
Many defenses are based on special accounting procedures. See generally H. TAGOAltT,
COST JUSTIFICATION (1959).
17. The need for methods of evaluating pricing structure is demonstrated in FTC
v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). Morton had a special pricing system that provided for discounts based on two criteria: single car-load orders and accumulated purchases. The structure seemed to give preferential treatment to a few large buyers. The
Court concluded that the effects of a pricing system are crucial elements that must be
examined. The discounts must be practically available to everyone, not simply theoretically available. See also United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962).
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tremely important. The original vertical integration of the Rose company-a quarry and a cement plant-should have given that firm a competitive advantage. However, if Rose had used his quarry to supply only
his needs for stone, he would have lost valuable economies of scale in
his operations. The cost of internally supplied stone would have been
greater than externally purchased stone. By maintaining regular production, Rose could satisfy his cement requirements and sell the excess.
This excess stone competed directly with gravel from the Dooley
quarry. Thus in order to justify regular operation, Rose merely had
to cover his incremental costs of production. This type of competition
was disastrous for Dooley.
Legal analysis of the economic effects in Rose demands initial recognition of one principle: while the contested pricing agreements allowed Dooley to eliminate Rose as a competitor, such a result is not
a violation of North Carolina antitrust laws.' s The special contract
price given to Rose as consideration for the lease of his quarry appears
lawful. 9 Nevertheless, the inclusion of minimum prices that Dooley
18. See Morehead Sea Food Co. v. Way, 169 N.C. 679, 86 S.E. 603 (1915).
19. See Texas Gulf Sulfur v. J.R. Simplot Co., 418 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1969). The
plaintiff cited this case, which found no price discrimination, because of its factual similarity to Rose and the nature of the protection bargained for by Simplot, protection from
upward swings in price. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, vol. 15, at 11, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C. App. 695, 190 S.E.2d 719 (1972). The creation of the contract
in Simplot was a natural and sound business decision for a purchaser who depends primarily on one input. However, the contract was not unbalanced: the agreements gave
Texas Gulf a relatively stable demand against which to schedule production, allowing
the company to increase efficiency and reduce cost. In addition, if the market price
decreased, Texas Gulf would be protected within a narrow range.
Rose attempted to secure the same advantage which Simplot acquired in its agreement. However, Rose went further and acquired protection from downward swings in
price. The agreements did not require that Rose purchase stone from Dooley. Rose
had to continue his purchases only so long as he could not secure stone from another
quarry at a price (including the costs of transportation) that was less than the price
charged by Dooley. Meanwhile, the restrictive agreements prevented Dooley from lowering his price to retain customers or to attract new purchasers. If prices declined
greatly, Dooley would have no buyers other than Rose. This threat of a shift in orders
gave Rose a bargaining advantage with which he could have obtained new agreements
from Dooley with lower purchase prices for the stone.
The Rose decision can thus be distinguished from Simplot by combining contract
theory and practical economics. First, in Simplot mutual advantages were obtained by
each party in the agreements. In Rose all of the contract provisions benefited Rose.
Dooley obtained his advantages from the economic setting, the creation of a local monopoly. Secondly, benefits and losses in 'Simplot affected only the parties involved. In
Rose, Dooley was greatly restricted in his pricing decisions during periods of market decline. However, Rose probably would never lose anything. The real "losers" were
Rose's competitors and the eventual consumers. Other purchasers were required to pay
an artificially high price for stone. This excess could either be absorbed or transferred
to the public. In either case the actual burden of the agreements was carried by other
parties.
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could charge other buyers was a basis for claiming unlawful price dis20
crimination.
The dynamic nature of the pricing agreements should be the basis
for legal analysis. If the market price for crushed stone had fallen,
other cement companies in competition with Rose would have been
forced to absorb transportation costs from distant quarries to compete
with Rose in the Elkin market since the Dooley quarry could not lower
its price because of the agreements. All of the purchasers would have
been on an equal footing only when Rose's competitors could have purchased gravel at distant quarries for prices substantially less than those
which Dooley charged Rose. 21 Rose thus secured a cheap supply of
stone and a preferred position for cement manufacture through the price
differential.22 It is this differential which is important, not the prices
themselves.
Indeed, North Carolina precedent exists to support a finding of
illegal discrimination. In Shute v. Shute2" the supreme court consid20. Inclusion of the restriction on prices to other customers provides the basis for
distinguishing Rose from a factually similar case in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court
held that a contract authorizing lower prices to one customer than to all other customers
did not violate the Unfair Practices Act of Utah, UTAH CODE § 16A-4-3(a) (1943)
(now UTAH CODE § 13-5-3(a) (1953)), a statute containing provisions similar to the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970). Burt v. Woolsulate, Inc., 106 Utah 156,
146 P.2d 203 (1944).
21. The competitive positions of all purchasers will be exactly equal when the market price for stone plus transportation costs equals the contract price between Dooley
and Rose. However, the spread resulting from transportation costs may be substantial.
Goods that are heavy or bulky have relatively high transportation costs. At some point
it becomes more profitable to build a new plant than to ship these products. As a result,
regional monopolies or oligopolies are created. This trend towards monopolization is
accelerated when the industry depends on a resource that is available only in certain
areas. Therefore, the supply of crushed stone and the transportation costs of cement
have been the prime factors in the creation of a cement industry which is an accumulation of regional oligopolies.
22. If the purpose of the arrangement had only been to assure the Plaintiff
a favorable price, it would have been sufficient to set out the price at which
Plaintiff could buy stone and there would have been no need to provide in the
agreement that Dooley would not sell to other customers at prices less than
those provided for. However, by providing for price discrimination between
the Plaintiff and other customers, the agreements became an unreasonable restraint upon trade and contrary to public policy.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, vol. 15, at 10, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C.
App. 695, 190 S.E.2d 719 (1972).
23. 176 N.C. 462, 97 S.E. 392 (1918). Other jurisdictions have cases legally similar to Shute. For example, in Clark v. Needham, 125 Mich. 84, 83 N.W. 1027 (1900),
the Michigan Supreme Court considered the practical consequences of a lease of manufacturing machinery and voided the contract. The lessor did not intend to use the machinery. Rather, the lease was an indirect method for creating a monopoly. In addition, when the contract was voided, no unjust enrichment resulted because the machinery
was returned to the lessee. These factors make the case factually similar to Rose.
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ered actual economic effects and motives in describing the sale of a

cotton gin as an illegal division of marketing territories. However, in
Rose the supreme court refused to follow Shute. By strictly construing

the jurisdictional requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act and of section 75-5(b) (5) of the North Carolina General Statutes, 24 the court
precluded the application of either statute.2 5
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AS A "RESTRAINT OF TRADE"

The supreme court also considered the broader question of
whether price discrimination was a "restraint of trade" under North
Carolina General Statute section 75-1,26 a copy of section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 7 Although section 75-1 has a federal parentage, the scope
of the statute is not necessarily defined by federal precedent. The
analysis because of legislative
court outlined its own procedure 2 for
8
failure to define "restraint of trade.
24. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
25. The defendant contended that State v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., 210 N.C. 742,
188 S.E. 412 (1936) supported the application of section 75-5(b)(5). Brief for Defendant-Appellant, vol. 15, at 12, Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 15 N.C. App. 695, 190 S.E.
2d 719 (1972). While a territorial division was in issue in Atlantic Ice, the court's decision in that case was based on section 75-5(b) (3), not on section 75-5(b) (5).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1965) provides: "Combinations in restraint of trade
illegal.-Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce in the State of North Carolina is hereby declared to
be illegal. .. ."
27. Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 655, 194 S.E.2d 521, 530 (1973).
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
28. The method of analysis chosen by the court appears to be logical on its face.
Factual and legal evaluations of trade restraints are to be analyzed relative to a spectrum
of judicial applications which runs from common-law definitions to federal interpretations of the Sherman Act The court implied that an integral part of the Rose decision
would be to determine the position of North Carolina antitrust law on this continuum.
However, the court used this outline only in form, not in substance.
The court maintained that the defendant had attempted to define price discrimination as a per se offense, a contention that exceeded the judicially defined scope of the
Sherman Act. Nevertheless, an attempt to balance the interests of the parties was precluded by the court's specifications of the burden of proof. See notes 40-43 infra. Thus,
the North Carolina Supreme Court was not forced to determine the scope of restraint
of trade under the "rule of reason."
In determining that no violation existed, the court took the narrowest view possible
of its own procedure for analysis. The court refused to consider the effect of the special
standards established in the Robinson-Patman Act on Sherman Act coverage. See 1 R.
CALLmANN, THn LAw oF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES 335 (3d
ed. 1967). Application of the Sherman Act was thus considered only in a situational
context (relative to offenses previously attacked by judicial application) rather than in
a policy context (relative to the logic for applying rules of analysis). Consequently,
the court violated a policy established by the United States Supreme Court for interpreting the Sherman Act: "That statute is aimed at substance rather than form." United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947). In addition, this difference cannot
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G.S. 75-2 says that "[a]ny . . . contract . . . in restraint
of trade or commerce which violates the principles of the common
law is hereby declared to be a violation of § 75-1." Thus, the
common law on restraint of trade is determinative of at least the
minimum scope of G.S. 75-1. And, the body of law applying the
Sherman Act, although not binding upon this court in applying G.S.
75-1, is29nonetheless instructive in determining the full reach of that
statute.

The federal courts have not analyzed price discrimination as a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act because such cases have been
decided under the more specialized provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act.30 Thus, in the absence of federal authority, the supreme court

turned its attention to common-law precedent on "restraints of trade."' '
Although every restraint of trade was illegal under the original,
common-law rule, this rule has been modified. If the restraint is intro-

duced to protect the consideration exchanged by the parties and its
scope is reasonably restricted in time and place, it may be upheld.

These restrictions are auxilliary elements in the creation of the agreement; their use is "ancillary" to the primary purpose of the agree-

ment.32 A "rule of reason" was used to evaluate these restrictions.5 3
be classified merely as structural analysis. See Mueller, The New Antitrust: A "Structural" Approach, 12 VmL. L. Rnv. 764 (1967). Nevertheless, even if Rose had accepted
the policy arguments, the refusal of the court to acknowledge an obvious discrimination
as sufficient proof was a gap that could not be bridged by any logical statement.
This judicial maneuvering precluded consideration of the Sherman Act. Under its
own common-law powers, the North Carolina Supreme Court in effect dictated that the
common law on restraints of trade would become the standard of application for section
75-1. This section thus adds nothing to the prohibitions in section 75-2.
29. 282 N.C. at 655, 194 S.E.2d at 530.
30. Theoretically, the Sherman Act could have been used to attack price discrimination. Dixon, Price Discriminationand the Sherman Act, 27 ABA ANTITRUST SEcnON 13 (1965). However, Congress created a special standard under the Robinson-Patman Act. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act, reads:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved are in commerce,
. and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
(emphasis added). The "substantial effect" standard of the Act seems to place this test
between the standards of the "rule of reason" and the per se rule. Rudolf Callmann
gives a more precise explanation.
While the Sherman Act condemns certain acts as illegal by virtue of their
intended purpose, a Clayton Act violation ex hypothesi requires proof that the
challenged act will have, or is likely to have, the prohibited effect. Thus, the
measure of legality under the Clayton Act is whether the defendant's conduct
is likely to diminish competition substantially.
1 R. CALLmANN, supra note 28, at 330. For application of this standard see United
Biscuit Co. of America v. FTC, 350 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
926 (1966); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1965).
31. See note 28 supra.
32. The distinction between ancillary and non-ancillary restraints is not solely
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According to the North Carolina Supreme Court, non-ancillary trade restrictions do not protect the exchange of consideration, but establish
special economic advantages. These restraints will not be analyzed for
4
their reasonableness. Rather, they will be considered per se illegal.1

The supreme court in Rose applied the "rule of reason" to the
alleged price discrimination even though this restraint was not recog-

nized at common law. The court's use of this rule was probably based
on its intuition of the probability that the activity would restrain trade.

Per se offenses generally have high probabilities of restricting competition, while only a moderate possibility for such restriction exists with
ancillary restraints.

The court simply assumed -that only a moderate

probability of illegality exists with price discrimination.
The court's application of the "rule of reason!' is supported by

pragmatic economic policy. Price changes normally can be applied as
a dynamic force to increase competition. However, this power, when
combined with substantial financial strength, can be used to create
based on the purposes for which the restrictions are created. The effects of ancillary
restraints, often used in employment contracts and in contracts for the sale of goodwill,
are felt primarily by the parties directly involved in the transaction. On the other hand,
non-ancillary restraints have significant effects on third parties in the market. See note
19 supra. Interestingly, price discrimination generally has been attacked under statutory
schemes which have invalidated non-ancillary restraints. For a general discussion of ancillary and non-ancillary restraints in North Carolina see Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair
Trade Practices in North Carolina-Federal Law Compared, 50 N.C.L. RV. 199
(1972).
Specific aspects of the North Carolina statutes as well as the common law doctrines have been separately analyzed in other articles. See Breckenridge, Restraint of
Trade in North Carolina, 7 N.C.L. Rlv. 249 (1929); Note, PartialEnforcement of Restrictive Covenants, 50 N.C.L. Rv. 689 (1972); Comment, Consumer Protection and
Unfair Competition in North Carolina-The 1969 Legislation, 48 N.C.L. REV. 896
(1970); Comment, Law of Unfair Competition in North Carolina, 46 N.C.L. Rav. 856
(1968); Note, Covenants Not to Compete, 38 N.C.L. REv. 395 (1960).
33. The "rule of reason" was formulated by the Supreme Court in Chicago Bd. of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In applying this standard, the Court was
attempting to balance potential benefits and harms of the challenged activities. For a
thorough analysis of this method of evaluation see Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in
Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 23 (1964).
34. Various activities have been deemed per se unlawful under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts,
and tying arrangements. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). See
generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965); von Kalinowski, The "PerSe" Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 569 (1964) (fear of inappropriate
expansion and reliance on the per se rule); Comment, The Per Se Illegality of PriceFixing-Sans Power, Purpose, or Effect, 19 U. Cm. L. Rav. 837 (1952). North Carolina has also used the per se rule to evaluate conduct and to enforce its antitrust laws.
State v. Craft, 168 N.C. 273, 83 S.E. 772 (1914). See Aycock, supra note 32, at 21314.
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monopolies and to restrain trade.3 5 The legality of price discrimination
thus depends on the particular factual situation.
No precise mechanism exists to determine when the "rule of
reason" or the per se rule should be applied. However, where the benefits of discrimination are recognized and occur frequently, the flexibility afforded by the "rule of reason" allows the beneficial aspects of
that conduct to be utilized more fullyY For that reason the balancing
test of the "rule of reason" is preferable to the absolute standard of
the per se rule for cases of price discrimination.
Before the "rule of reason" can be applied, however, the burdens
of proof must be allocated. When a party attempts to enforce an agreement containing an ancillary restraint, he must demonstrate the reasonableness of the restraint as part of his prima facie case.87 However,
Rose decided that in price discrimination cases the party alleging the
illegality must prove the unreasonableness of the restraint.88 Thus,
price discrimination is held analogous to ancillary restraints for purposes
of applying the "rule of reason" apparently because of the court's assumption that under the probability test both concepts offer an equal
probability of causing harm. However, the court did not consider them
analogous for purposes of allocating the burden of proof.8 9
35. Congress apparently recognized the potentiality of both benefit and harm when
it enacted Robinson-Patman in which price discrimination was not made a per se offense. Whitaker Cable Corp. v. FTC, 239 F.2d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1956). But see
Wood, Antitrust Policy: a View from Corporate Counsel, in PERSPECTIVES ON ANTITRUST PoLicy 368, 387 (A. Phillips ed. 1965) (claiming the "substantially lessen"
standard of Robinson-Patman is really closely analogous to the per se rule in its opera.
tion). One criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act has been the element of rigidity
which it has introduced into the market. Austern, Problems and Prospects in Antitrust
Policy-I, in PERSPECTIVES ON ANTrRuST POLICY 3, 26 (A. Phillips ed. 1965).
36. Many states have statutory or constitutional provisions which make restrictive
agreements and contracts automatically void. North Carolina does not have such a pro-

vision. J.

FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION

75 (1964)

(citing

relevant state statutes and criticizing these automatic provisions).
37. Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944). However, this is not an
excessive burden. The court in such cases has been concerned primarily with the time
and the area of the restriction which is often shown on the face of the agreement. That
showing was seemingly made in Rose.
38. 282 N.C. at 657, 194 S.E.2d at 531.
39. In addition, the probability test unfortunately omits one important element
from its analysis, the comparative frequency or severity of these two concepts. If ancillary restraints are more frequent and more severe than price discriminations, the court
arguably distributed the burden of proof properly. The court is simply favoring the parties opposing the more serious restriction. However, the court gave no indication that
it considered this question. It only stated a conclusion. Of course, the supreme court's
allocation of the burden may simply be a method used to avoid consideration of price
discrimination.
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Viewed from another perspective, the Rose decision can be
treated as another example of the problems and confusion that
accompany defensive pleadings in antitrust cases.40 Although the
same prima facie standards should apply to both offensive and defen-

sive uses of the statutes,41 courts have been unreceptive to defensive
attempts to complicate simple litigation. Nevertheless, because an offensive user of the statutes must only prove a discrimination and injury,
it seems inequitable to require a defensive user to prove an unreasonable
discrimination and injury.4 2 Unfortunately, this prejudice is not unique
to the North Carolina Supreme43 Court. This affliction has surfaced
even in the highest federal court.
40. The complex problems of proof encountered when antitrust violations are
pleaded as a defense may be traced to congressional failure to specify the defensive scope
of the Sherman Act. The importance of the conflicting policies-the need to discourage
antitrust violations with a uniform method of interpretation versus the equity of avoiding
unjust enrichment-has prevented even the United States Supreme Court from outlining
clear rules of interpretation. Sobel, Antitrust Defenses to Contract Actions: A Question of Policy Priorities,16 ANTIRusT BULL. 455 (1971).
Creation of the antitrust defense is an extension of the common-law doctrine of
contract illegality based on violations of public policy. Lockhart, Violation of AntiTrust Law as a Defense in Civil Actions, 31 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1947) (first major
analysis of the defense problem with an excellent historical review). See generally
Comment, The Defense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract Actions, 27 U. Cm. L. Rnv.
758 (1960).
41. Under the guise of "unreasonableness," the North Carolina Supreme Court
seems to have applied a "substantial effect' standard, a derivative of the Robinson-Patman Act. If this was done, however, the same prima facie requirements should have
been transferred to plaintiffs. F. RowE, supra note 14, at 109 (distribution of the burden of proof under Robinson-Patman). However, the court did not account for the specialized wording of the Robinson-Patman Act. Although the analogy between the "substantial effect" standard and the "rule of reason" may be viable, the court's ruling on
the burden of proof encounters serious obstacles when N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(7)
(1965) is applied since the possibility for applying a per se rule exists under that section. See Aycock, supra note 32, at 216-17.
42. The morass of conflicts created by judicial explanations has produced suggestions for reform. One writer has proposed that the relative guilt or innocence of the
parties involved should be the determining factor in the allocation. Comment, The Defense of Antitrust Illegality in Contract Actions: A Suggested Rationale, 15 U. KAN.
L. REv. 183 (1966). Nevertheless, such a policy merely substitutes one problem of balancing for another and is thus not a substantial improvement. Another suggestion incorporates the policy considerations of equity and antitrust enforcement into procedural
requirements. The use of rebuttable presumptions, when combined with the "rule of reason," creates not only a uniform pattern of analysis for all types of restraints, but also
distributes the burden of proof more equitably. Note, A Suggested Role for Rebuttable
Presumptions in Antitrust Restraint of Trade Litigation, 1972 DUKE L.. 595. The major problem with this method is that it complicates an otherwise simple contract action.
However, the pleading of the antitrust violation in its present form is an even greater
complication.
43. The reasons for avoiding analysis can be seen clearly in Supreme Court cases
attempting to resolve the problem. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); Bruce's
Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947); A.B. Small Co. v. Lambomn
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The problems raised by allocation of proof for defensive pleadings
are complicated by the use of the "rule of reason." The pleadings and
proof demanded by the court to satisfy the prima facie standard become
the minimum interests which the court is allowed to balance. Increases
in the prima facie standard of the burden of proof only narrow the range
of analysis for which the "rule of reason" would be applicable.
Nevertheless, another statutory solution, section 75-5(b)(7), was
available to the North Carolina Supreme Court that would not have presented such problems of interpretation. 44 However, the court disposed
of the applicability of this provision in a most unusual manner.
Perhaps the portion of the contract purporting to fix the minimum
price at which customers other than plaintiff could buy stone is
illegal price fixing under G.S. 75-1 and G.S. 75-5(b)(7) ...
But we do not decide this question since the invalidity of this portion would not affect the validity of those portions
of the contract
45
establishing the price at which plaintiff could buy.

The court seems to have manufactured a mystical basis for
severance. By its very nature, price discrimination involves a minimum
of two sales and two buyers. 6 No discrimination can occur when all
sales are made to one party. The unreasonableness of sales to other
purchasers is evaluated not by absolute price but by their relation to
prices charged to the favored buyer. The attack is on the differential-the discrimination-and not on the prices themselves. The

court's use of severance implies a judicial misunderstanding of the
offense. Thus, perhaps, the purpose for using severability was the reluctance of the court to interpret section 75-5(b) (7), which appears

applicable to the facts in Rose and is not limited by grammatical
construction as is section 75-5 (b) (5).47
& Co., 267 U.S. 248 (1925); Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 212
U.S. 227 (1909); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b) (7) (1965) states as follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided by article 10 of chapter 66, entitled
"Fair Trade," while engaged in buying or selling any goods in this State to
make, enter into, execute or carry out any contract, obligation or agreement
of any kind by which the parties thereto or any two or more of them bind
themselves not to sell or dispose of any goods or any article of trade, use or
consumption, below a common standard figure, or fixed value, or establish or
settle the price of such goods between them, or between themselves and others,
at a fixed or graduated figure, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free
and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale of such goods.
45. 282 N.C. at 658, 194 S.E.2d at 531 (emphasis by the court).
46. See notes 9-10 supra.
47. Section 75-5(b)(7) does not require sales in two different areas and does not
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The failure of the supreme court to consider section 75-5 (b) (7)
removed a major interpretive obstacle; the court was not forced to
consider whether the "rule of reason" or the per se rule would be used
to interpret section 75-5(b) (7). Strictly construed, the per se rule
should be applied. The special federal standard for evaluating price
discrimination is demanded by the restrictive wording of -theRobinsonPatman Act, 48 but section 75-5(b)(7) has no such restrictive language.4" In addition, other sections of chapter 75, not influenced by the
"restraint of trade" limitation of section 75-1, have been regarded as
per se offenses.50 On the other hand, federal experience with problems
of interpretation and enforcement in cases of price discrimination might
imply that the "rule of reason' is to be used, apart from the wording of
the Robinson-Patman Act. However, to be consistent, the court should
use federal precedent under Robinson-Patman. If federal interpretations had been applied, the activities of the parties in Rose could have
been held illegal.5 1
FUTURE APPLICATION OF

ROSE

The manner in which the court disposed of Rose renders it a
highly technical and limited decision on price discrimination. If price
discrimination is pleaded as a defense, the party claiming the discrimination must prove the unreasonableness of the discrimination
under section 75-1. When the court is subsequently faced with an offensive assertion of a restraint, it will have two available avenues for
review consistent with Rose. On the one hand, Rose can be distinguished as a defensive pleading case, and the court can thus hold that
price discrimination is covered by either section 75-1 or section 75-5
limit its application to sellers. Aycock, supra note 32, at 215-16.
supra.
48. 1 R. CALLmANN, supra note 28, at 947.

See notes 10 & 44

49. Aycock, supra note 32, at 216-17 (contention that section 75-5(b)(7) should
use the per se rule for interpretation).
50. Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N.C. 38, 198 S.E. 364 (1938) (section 75-5
(b)(3)); Standard Fashion Co. v. Grant, 165 N.C. 453, 81 S.E. 606 (1914) (section
75-5(b) (2)).

51. The original problem that prevented the supreme court from applying the Robinson-Patman Act was a lack of jurisdiction created by the defendant's failure to offer

proof of an interstate sale. The court never reached the issue of whether competition
was in fact substantially lessened. This factual question should form the core of a
prima facie case under Robinson-Patman; however, as a practical matter, few cases have
meticulously analyzed the difference between "substantial" and "inconsequential," especially as a means for dismissing a suit. F. RowE, supra note 14, at 132. The requirement

has been weakened by expansive decisions of the federal courts.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).

See, e.g., Moore v.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

(b) (7). The plaintiff in that situation will merely be required to prove
the offense and the injury.
On the other hand, the court might extend the severance theory
of Rose. Offensive and defensive application of antitrust statutes in
North Carolina would be relatively consistent, except for some distinctions in the burden of proof. Effectively, North Carolina would have
no price discrimination statute. The legislature would have to express
a clear intent to attack price discrimination by enacting another statute.
The preferred course of action would be the application of an
existing statute, section 75-5(b)(7). This statute can be interpreted
as a broadly worded provision attacking price discrimination.52 Of
course, this choice would mean the abandonment of the severance
option used in Rose. Distinguishing the Rose case as a decision on
defensive pleading is not entirely satisfactory; nevertheless, the inequity
produced by pleading can be attacked separately in another case. The
issues of the Rose decision will be confusing enough for later
applications without offering numerous distinctions in a single court
opinion.
If the court does apply section 75-5(b) (7), it must face the
problem avoided by the Rose decision-whether to apply the "rule
of reason" or the per se rule. Although the statute specifically condemns agreements created "directly or indirectly to preclude a free and
unrestricted competition," the court could emphasize legislative use
of the verb "preclude." The court could find that the General Assembly intended to create a substantive standard requiring proof of
more than a mere discrimination, a test analogous to the "substantial
effect" standard of Robinson-Patman.58 The selection of "preclude"
arguably demands proof of some degree of exclusion by the discrimination. Such reasoning, it is true, does distort the wording of the statute,
52. Aycock, supranote 32, at 206-07, 215-16.
53. Any encouragement of a "substantial effect" standard must be prefaced by a
warning. While the rule delineates possible evaluations, it is still very difficult to apply.
Indeed, federal courts have experienced great difficulty in applying the Robinson-Patman
Act and have been condemned in many of their attempts. In addition, the reluctance
of the court in Rose to use existing mechanisms in the antitrust area will be present,
no matter what rule is applied.
Nevertheless, the "substantial effect" rule should prove beneficial. The demand for
proof of noticeable economic constrictions is generally one-sided, avoiding the flood of
information in cases using the "rule of reason." The requirement that the effects of
the restriction be demonstrated prevents repetitive pleadings of the statute for minor violations, a potential problem if a per se rule is applied. But see Austern, supra note 14;
Austern, supra note 35.
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but a per se interpretation may make the provision unpalatable for the
court.
Continued reliance on the severance theory demonstrates an
additional problem. The General Assembly has established an integrated network of legislation condemning trade restrictions. However,
many of these provisions were enacted even though statutes existed
which covered the condemned conduct. 54 Like other state courts,
those in North Carolina have been reluctant to evaluate specialized
economic restraints. In order to avoid analyzing these economic
problems, the courts have abdicated their responsibility passing the interpretive burden to the legislatures. In an era when potential restraints
of trade are as plentiful as gas pumps, 55 the judiciary must realistically
apply antitrust law. North Carolina needs a bolder state policy of
antitrust interpretation and enforcement 6 which only the courts can
provide.
Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co.1 7 was far from the ideal case for an
analysis of price discrimination. The complications of defensive pleading as well as the factual complexity of the lease distorted the issue
of price discrimination. Although the supreme court held that two antitrust provisions could not be applied, it did not positively restrict the
application of 75-5(b) (7). This omission may be the most significant
aspect of the case. Until a case comes before the court in which price
discrimination is pleaded by an offended party, North Carolina will
have only a technical, nondefinitive decision on price discrimination.
T. CARLTON YOUNGER, JR.
54. Aycock, supra note 32, at 215.
55.

FTC, REPORT ON ANTICOMPETrrVE PRACTiCES iN THE MARKETING OF GASO-

LINE (1967).

56. Aycock, supra note 32, at 254. The problems of legislative construction and
judicial interpretation are not unique to North Carolina. The multiple problems produced by internally inconsistent state provisions and the lack of state enforcement have
produced various suggestions for reform. See Barron, California Antitrust-Legislative
Schizophrenia, 35 S. CAL. L. RFv. 393 (1962) (internal conflict of California laws);
Rabl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TExAs L. Rav. 753 (1961) (lack
of state enforcement); Stern, A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and Commentary on a Draft Statute, 39 TEXAs L. REv. 717 (1961) (problem for interstate corporations with the variation in state antitrust law). Note, The Present Revival and Future
Course of State Antitrust Enforcement, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 575 (1963).
57. 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

Securities Law-Rule 10b-5-They Had So Many Plaintiffs They
Didn't Know What To Do
In surveying the development of "standing" criteria under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and SEC rule lOb-52
it is hard not to think of Humpty Dumpty who told Alice, "When I use
a word, . . . it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor
less." 3 The history of standing criteria is one of constant redefinition.
In early cases, only purchasers or sellers had standing to sue for fraud
violations of IOb-5. Exceptions have developed through expansive interpretations of the words "purchaser" and "seller." Critics have suggested and one appellate court has switched to a "new" criterion 4 in
which investors rather than purchasers and sellers have standing. Acceptance of this test reminds this writer of another of Alice's acquaintances, the Red Queen, who told Alice, "[it takes all the running you
can do, to keep in the same place." After more than two decades
1. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange()" 'To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any devise, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3. L. CARROLL, THROUGH Tim LOOKING GLASS (1871), reprinted in THn ANNOTATED ALICE 269 (M. Gardner ed. 1960) (emphasis omitted).
4. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974); Bradford, Rule 10b-5: The Search for a Limiting
Doctrine, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 205 (1970) (advocates amendments by Congress and
the SEC); Note, The Purchaser-SellerLimitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 684 (1968) (advocates standing for "any person"); Comment, The PurchaserSeller Rule: An Archaic Tool for Determining Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEO.
L.J. 1177 (1968) (advocates investor standing); Note, 10b-5 Standing Under Birnbaum:
The Case of the Missing Remedy, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1007 (1973) (advocates "case or
controversy" standing); Comment, The Birnbaum Doctrine Revisited: Standing to Sue
Under Rule 10b-5 Analyzed, 37 Mo. L. REv. 481 (1972) (advocates investor standing
tied to a purchase or sale); 1967 DUKE L.J. 898 (advocates investor standing).
5. L. CARROLL, ThRoUGH Tim LoOKMNG GLASS (1871), reprinted in Tim AN.
NOTATED ALicE 210 (M. Gardner ed. 1960) (emphasis omitted).
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of case by case adjudication, we start the process over again using
different terminology.
The purchaser-seller rule originated with Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp.0 in which the plaintiff brought an -action on a statutory
tort theory. Judge Augustus Hand writing for the Second Circuit held
that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 protected only purchasers and sellers;
-therefore, the plaintiff lacked standing.7
By the mid-sixties, however, exceptions had developed to the extent that the opponents of the purchaser-seller rule prepared to celebrate its final demise.8 But the prophets of doom spoke too soon, for
the Birnbaum doctrine survived, "[bloody but unbowed."9 In the
early seventies, the courts were close to settling upon an expanded, yet
functional, purchaser-seller rule. The Ninth Circuit decision in Mount
Clemens Industries, Inc. v. Bell' typified the state of the law. The
court decided that the flexibility required in the application of lOb5 was possible within the purchaser-seller restriction. In addition to
permitting standing for purchasers and sellers," the court recognized
exceptions giving standing to parties to an aborted contract for purchase
or sale,' 2 and to "forced sellers" in short form mergers.1 3 An exception
has also been recognized for plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief.'"
6. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
7. Id. at 464. Some courts and some commentators have failed to recognize that
Birnbaum enunciated a rule of statutory standing. E.g., Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip
Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 146 (9th Cir. 1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting); Mount Clemens
Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d
792, 805 (5th Cir. 1970); Whitaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA.
L. REV. 543, 549-50 (1971); Note, 24 H-AsTiNs L.., supra note 4, at 1036; Comment,
37 Mo. L.REv., supra note 4 (initially distinguished statutory and constitutional standing but confused them in conclusion); Comment, The Purchaser-SellerRequirement of
10b-5 Reevaluated, 44 U. COLO. L.REV. 151, 159 (1972). Their analyses of the purchaser-seller rule in terms of constitutional standing requirements is responsible for some
of the imprecision in the analysis of 10b-5 standing problems. See text accompanying
notes 43-53 infra.
8. Fleischer, "FederalCorporationLaw?" An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1146
(1965); Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for 10b-5, 54
VA. L. Rav. 268 (1968); Note, 53 CORNEL L. REV., supra note 4; Note, Inroads on
the Necessity for a Consummated Purchase or Sale Under Rule 10b-5, 1969 DuKE L.J.
349; Comment, 56 GEO. LI, supra note 4; Comment, Another Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: "Tolls the Knell of Parting Day?", 25 U. MIAMI I. RIv. 131 (1970);
Comment, The Decline of the Purchaser-SellerRequirement of Rule l0b-5, 14 VILL. L.
Rav. 499 (1969).
9. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
10. 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
11. Id. at 345. The plaintiff could sue either individually or derivatively. Id. at
347 n.14.
12. Id. at 345-46.
13. Id. at 346.
14. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); cf. Mount
Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 346 (9th Cir. 1972).
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The recent decisions in Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps15

and Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.'" must be considered
against the background. The Ninth Circuit was confronted with a complex factual situation in Manor Drug. The defendants had been in-

volved in an antitrust action that had resulted in a consent decree"r providing for the reorganization of Blue Chip Stamp Company and an offering of the reorganized corporation's stock to the non-stockholding

users of Blue Chip Stamps.' 8 In connection with the required offering,
the defendant allegedly prepared a prospectus " 'calculated to mislead
and dissuade users not knowledgeable of the true value of [the] shares

from purchasing [the] shares' "'9 and thereby violated rule lOb-5.
The court, purporting to apply the purchaser-seller rule as set out
in Mount Clemens, identified two functions of the rule. First, the rule
had -to fulfill the intent of Congress to eliminate fraud in the investment
process.2 0 Secondly, the rule had to limit standing under 10b-5 to a
plaintiff with a "provable" case; 21 the plaintiff had to allege a relationship indicating his ability to show" 'proof of loss and the causal connection with the alleged violation of the Rule.' ",22
15. 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3108 (U.S.
Aug. 15, 1974) (No. 74-124), noted in 8 GA. L. Rnv. 487 (1974).
16. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1979 (1974). The reaction to Eason has been considerable. Note, Standing to Sue in 10b-5 Actions: Eason
v. GMAC and Its Impact on the Birnbaum Doctrine, 49 NoTmn DAMn LAw. 1131
(1974) is a complete discussion of the decision which favors the Eason approach over
the purchaser-seller rule, but perceives problems which can best be solved by congressional action. See 42 FoRDHM L. REv. 688 (1974); 27 VAND. L. REv. 572 (1974) (applauding Eason).
Judicial reaction to Eason has been less favorable. The Fifth Circuit has expressly
reaffirmed the purchaser-seller rule in Sargeant v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 764 (5th
Cir. 1974); accord, Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Third Circuit, shortly before Eason, reaffirmed the validity of the Birnbaum
doctrine. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 158 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
1979 (1974). Since Eason, the Third Circuit has had the opportunity to repudiate Birnbaum, but has instead reaffirmed in dictum. In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d
528, 533 n.5 (3d Cir. 1974).
The Supreme Court is not anxious to resolve this conflict between the circuits. Denials of certiorari in Eason and Landy came on April 22, 1974 with the Chief Justice
and Justices White and Douglas favoring the granting of certiorari in both cases. 94
S. Ct. 1979 (1974).
17. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F.2d 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aft'd
mem. sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
18. These were the direct victims of the antitrust violation and the 10b-5 plaintiffs.
19. 492 F.2d at 139.
20. Id. at 140.
21. Id. at 141. The court considered this second purpose as the basis for the various exceptions which developed under Birnbaum.
22. Id., quoting Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir.
1967).
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Under the traditional purchaser-seller rule, an actual sale or contract for sale provided the necessary proof of loss and causation. In
Manor Drug the consent decree identified the potential purchasers and
the number of shares and the prices of the securities to be offered.
Therefore, the court viewed the consent decree as the functional equiv23
alent of a contract in its effect on the plaintiffs ability to prove loss.
Since the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements of the purchaser-seller
rule as defined by the Ninth Circuit, standing was allowed.
The problem with the "provable case" approach to standing is that
the purchaser-seller rule becomes dependent on the merits of the
plaintiff's case, rather than on some neutral principle discernible in the
relationship of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the alleged fraud.
Standing becomes in essence a function of the judge's perceptions of
the equities involved.
In Eason the plaintiffs (Eason and Satrom) were shareholders in
a corporation (Bank Service) which bought an automobile leasing business (from Dave Waite Pontiac) after the latter had been extended
credit by GMAC. As part of the consideration, Bank Service issued
7,000 shares of its stock to Dave Waite Pontiac and assumed -the debts
of the leasing business. Eason and Satrom executed guarantees of the
business' indebtedness to GMAC. When Bank Service defaulted,
GMAC brought suit on the guarantees in Indiana state court.2 4 Eason
and Satrom countered with a 10b-5 action in federal court alleging
fraud by GMAC and Dave Waite and seeking recission of the guarantees. 2 5 The court found a strict application of the Birnbaum rule to
be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's admonition that 10b-5 be construed broadly and flexibly.2 6 The court also rejected utilization of -the
liberalized purchaser-seller rule because constant redefinition of the
2
words "purchaser" and "seller" had rendered the rule ineffectiveY.
After holding that
the protection of the rule [10b-5] extends to persons who, in their
capacity as investors, suffered significant injury as a direct consequence of fraud in connection with a securities transaction, even
though their participation in the transaction did not involve either
the purchase or sale of a security, . ..2
23. 492 F.2d at 142. See also International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d
1334 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3666 (U.S. May 31, 1974) (No. 731542), discussed in note 69 infra.
24. 490 F.2d at 656.
25. Id.

26. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
27. 490 F.2d at 659.
28. Id. (emphasis added).
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the court found that Eason and Satrom "were certainly 'investors' in the
transaction which is allegedly tainted by fraud.",2' By failing to define
"investors," the opinion skirted the central issue of standing. 80 The
result in Eason indicates that the law on this issue may have run
through twenty years of lOb-5 litigation without coming any closer to
a satisfactory description of what constitutes standing for a lob-5 private action.
The limits of the Manor Drug "provable case" approach to
standing and the Eason "investor" approach may be determined by applying the holding of each case to the facts of the other. In applying
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Manor Drug to the faots before the
Seventh Circuit in Eason, it is clear that the plaintiffs in Eason had a
"provable case." The history of the acquisition by Bank Service and
the guarantees given by the plaintiffs provide the information necessary
to prove loss and a causal connection. However, a problem arises in
attempting to fit the Eason plaintiffs into the purchaser-seller rubric.
The guarantees given to GMAC could have been viewed as securities
sold by the
plaintiffs, but this would have stretched the definition of
"security."3'- An alternative would have been to view the events as a
single transaction. The plaintiffs gave their guarantees inducing
GMAC to permit the transfer of Dave Waite's company to Bank
Service in return for 7,000 shares of stock (securities). However, with
this approach it would have been necessary to treat the plaintiffs as sellers of securities issued by the corporation. This could not be done
because the plaintiffs were suing in -their individual capacities rather
than on behalf of the corporation. 2
Whether the Seventh Circuit's "investor" criterion would have afforded standing to the Manor Drug plaintiffs depends on the definition
given to "investor." If the court meant to use the word in the layman's
sense, 3 Manor Drug Stores would have lacked standing because it
never invested in anything. In fact, had the plaintiffs invested, there
would have been no injury; the fraud would have failed.8 4 Judge Kirk29. Id.
30. Id. at 660 n.29.
31. Id. at 656.
32. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970) (standing allowed plaintiffs
in derivative capacity, denied in individual capacity).
33. Investor is defined as "one who invests." Invest is defined as "To lay out
(money or capital) in business with the view of obtaining an income or profit ... "
WEBsim's NEw INTRNATONAL DIcIoNAaY (2d ed. 1959).
34. 492 F.2d at 140.
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patrick in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,"5 the first private action under 10b-5, described investors as persons "about to invest"3 6 or already
holding shares, while the Fifth Circuit has defined investors as persons
"engaged in buying and selling and trading."3 7 The Birnbaum rule was
arguably an attempt to define "investor" on the basis of the type of
transaction involved. 8
The Manor Drug plaintiffs would not fit within any of these definitions easily. Use of the "about to invest" definition would either reduce "investor" to a meaningless standard permitting anyone to sue on
a claimed intent to invest or require the plaintiff to allege an actual attempt to invest. Clearly, the plaintiffs did not meet the "buying and
selling and trading" definition. Without the Ninth Circuit's stretching
of the Birnbaum rule, the plaintiffs would not fit into the purchaser'3 9
seller definition of "investor."
The search for a functional standing requirement must start with
some basic propositions.
First, accurate analysis requires identification of the type of standing involved. Secondly, standing is a function
of the status of the plaintiff and should not depend upon the merits
of the plaintiff's case.4" Thirdly, congressional intent and purpose
should be considered. Finally, it should be recognized that a conflict
exists between the circuits, and the Supreme Court is not anxious to resolve the controversy. 41 A new standing criterion is most likely to be
accepted by the "Birnbaum circuits" if that new criterion is responsive
to the results of twenty years of litigation under the purchaser-seller
rubric.
Standing is a function of the statute under which the suit is
brought and of Article III of the Constitution.4" Rule lOb-5 litigation
has focused on statutory standing in situations in which the requirements for constitutional standing have been satisfied.4 3 A number of
commentators44 have approached the statutory standing problem by re35. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
36. Id. at 514 (dictum).
37. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
38. 492 F.2d at 143 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 143 n.1.
40. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
41. See note 16 supra.
42. U.S. CoNsT. art. UT, § 2.
43. See note 7 supra.
44. E.g., Whitaker, supra note 7; Comment, 37 Mo. L. Rav., supra note 4; Comment, 44 U. COLO. L. Rnv., supra note 7.
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lying on a series of cases decided by the Supreme Court" in 1968 and

1970 that support a liberal approach, one favoring plaintiffs in standing
questions. 46 In the most frequently cited case, Association of Data
ProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp,47 Justice Douglas articulated two ingredients of standing: the Article III requirement of "injury infact, '48 and "whether the interest sought to be protected by the

complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute . . . in question.

49

These cases are not applicable to the 10b-5 standing question.

Since they involved private plaintiffs suing an agent or agency of the
federal government,50 the Justices' perceptions of the Court as a buffer
protecting the citizen in the interface between government and governed influenced these decisions."1

A correct analysis of 10b-5 stand-

ing must rely upon cases decided in the implied tort context6 2 in which
one private party sues another private party for damages occasioned by
the defendant's violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The
Restatement of Torts section 286 provides that a cause of action exists
for a plaintiff, if the defendant violates a statute enacted for the plaintiff's protection. 3 The same requirement was enunciated in 1916 by
the Court: "A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful
45. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968);
Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
46. Davis, The LiberalizedLaw of Standing, 37 U. CH. L. REv. 450 (1970).
47. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805 (5th Cir.
1970); Note, 24 HAsTiNGS L.J., supra note 4, at 1036 n.105; Comment, 44 U. COLO.
L. REv., supra note 7.

48. 397 U.S. at 152.
49. Id. at 153.
50. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (suit by a tenant farmer challenging
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (suit by a private corporation challenging a ruling of the Comptroller of the Currency); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968) (taxpayer suit challenging the validity of HEW expenditures); Hardin v.
Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (suit by private corporation against the TVA).
Other recent decisions on standing are Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
(injunction sought against the Secretary of the Interior); Investment Co. Institute v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (challenging regulations promulgated by the Comptroller
of the Currency).
51. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 109-14 (1968) (Douglas, J.,concurring); see
Note, NoTn DAmE LAW., supra note 16 (recognizing the distinction between the Data
Processingtype of litigation and private lOb-5 actions).
52.

1 A. BROMBERO, SECURMiTEs LAw: FRAuD § 2.4(1)-(2) (1973).

The alterna-

tive to implied statutory tort as a theory was voidability under Securities Exchange Act
§ 29(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970); but this theory lost its hold with the decline of
privity. A. BROMMERG, supra, § 2.4(1) (b).
53. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 286 (1934) provides:
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act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial [sic] benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied. . . .""
The cases dealing
with standing to challenge government action do not necessitate the abandonment of the judicial self-restraint that has characterized decisions on standing in implied tort. If the courts substitute their judgment concerning who ought -to be protected from securities fraud for
that of Congress, they would be usurping the legislative function. 5
Statutory standing under 10b-5 depends on whether a plaintiff is
within the class of persons that Congress intended to protect when it
enacted section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.5 6 A reading of the legislative history51 of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act reveals that
Congress intended to establish market conditions in which investment
decisions could be made in a free and honest atmosphere. 58 The problem of uncertainty, inherent in investment decision-making, can be
minimized by the diversification of holdings that offsets the risk of unexpected loss with the potential of unexpected gain, or by the collection
of more accurate information with which to make decisions. 9 Congress
in the Securities and Exchange Acts attempted -to reduce uncertainty
through the second approach. With an assurance of accurate information, the investor can reduce the impact of the risks inherent in investment decision-making and thereby add stability to the securities
market.6 0
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by
failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an inter-

est of another if:
(a)

the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an

interest of the other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard, the invasion of the interest results from that hazard; and
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not
so conducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action.
54. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916); accord, Jacobson v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953), affd mem., 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
55. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-97 (1968).
56. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).

57. The legislative history of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act has been
compiled in an eleven volume work; J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE SECURTEs Acr OF 1933 AND SEcutrrES ExCHANGE Acr OF 1934 (1973).

58. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934) (Fletcher Report).
59. Hirshleifer, Investment: Investment Decision, in 8 INmNnATIONAL ENCYcLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 194, 199-202 (1968).

60. This may have been the logic behind an SEC proposal to use "decision making
groups" in analyzing standing under lOb-5. The proposal is suggested as a solution to
lob-5 standing in Comment, 56 GEo. LJ., supranote 4, at 1186.
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Congress intended to protect the integrity of investment decision-

making rather than to protect the investor per se. This concern for
minimizing risk can be translated into a definition of "investor" by introducing a "transaction" requirement."' In order to obtain investor
status, the plaintiff should be required to allege that the defendants'
actions had an adverse impact upon the integrity of the plaintiff's investment decision-making.

A transaction requirement is not new to lOb-5 litigation. 2 The
purchaser-seller rule required the plaintiff to allege that fraud touched
a completed transaction.0 3 The exceptions to the Birnbaum rule also

adapt themselves to transaction analysis."4
The Seventh Circuit apparently recognized a transaction requirement in Eason when it referred to the plaintiff's position as an " 'investor' in the transaction...
tainted by fraud," 5 and as a "[principal] in the transaction."00
The corporate mismanagement cases also reflect the influence of

the transaction concept.0 7 In Rekant v. Desser0 8 the plaintiff-shareholders sued the management of the corporation for fraud (i.e. mis-

management) that involved securities transactions.

Standing was al-

lowed in the derivative action and denied in the individual actions.
Under the transaction test the results would be the same. The fraud

did not impair the decision-making of the individuals because they were
not involved in the transaction; however, the corporation was involved
and its decision-making was affected.

The consideration of six possible situations will serve to illustrate
that the transaction test is responsive to the Birnbaum experience.

First, the plaintiff could make and act upon an investment decision.
This is the Eason situation and -the situation covered by a strict pur61. This requirement looks at the status of the plaintiff in the abstract and does
not imply use of reliance or materiality criteria.
62. See 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 52, § 8.8. There seems to be a natural tendency to group lob-5 standing cases into groups based upon the type of underlying transaction. See Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 49 TEXAs L.
REv. 617 (1971); Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing
to Sue Under lob-5 is Involved, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 93 (1970); Whitaker, supra note
7; Note, 24 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 4; Comment, 14 ViLL. L. Rav., supra note 8.
63. E.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1952).
64. See note 62 supra; text accompanying notes 70-72 infra.
65. 490 F.2d at 659.
66. Id. at 659-60.
67. For an excellent discussion of issues other than standing in corporate mismanagement cases see Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate
Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1007 (1973).
68. 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
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chaser-seller rule. The defendant sets out to influence an investment
decision, the decision is made and acted upon. Standing should not

69
be denied; the transaction is complete.
Alternatively, interference by the defendant could frustrate the in-

tention of the plaintiff.7"

These transactions are the frustrated offers

or aborted contracts for purchase or sale. Since the fraud affects the
plaintiff's investment decision-making, standing should be allowed.

Thirdly, the defendant could force the plaintiff into a decision.71
This is the short form merger in which the plaintiffs decisional freedom
is limited. Standing should be allowed.

Fourthly, manipulation of the market by the defendant could
hinder a plaintiff who desires to make an investment decision. 72 This
is the suit for injunctive relief. Standing should be allowed so that the
plaintiff's future investment decision may have full and effective protection consistent with the intent of Congress.
Fifthly, the plaintiff could be the recipient of a specific and indi-

vidually directed offer, and the actions of the defendant made the offer
less attractive. 73 If the plaintiff does nothing, the situation does not
indicate that the plaintiff made an investment decision, but only that
the defendant intended to interfere with any decision-making that the
plaintiff might make.

Standing should be denied because there is no

transaction in which decision-making can be found.
69. In International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3666 (U.S. May 31, 1974) (No. 73-1542), the court stretched the
definition of "sale" in order to give standing to the plaintiff under the purchaser-seller
rule. The plaintiff corporation was induced by a violation of 10b-5 to dispose of portfolio securities through a dividend in kind to its shareholders. Although no consideration was given by the shareholders, the court held, over the sharp dissent of Judge Mulligan, that the spin-off was a sale. The court admitted that the decision was without
precedential support, id. at 1344, and arguably contrary to an earlier second circuit case,
id. at 1344-45, 1358.
Under a transaction-investor criterion, the plaintiff would have obtained standing
because it made what the court recognized as an important decision concerning its investment holdings. Id. at 1346.
70. E.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417
F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,
375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
71. E.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 925 (1972); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
72. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950
(1970); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1969); Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1967).
73. This is the situation presented in Manor Drug; see text accompanying notes
17-19 supra.
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The final situation is virtually identical to the immediately preceding one except that the offer was not directed to any particular individuals. 4 If the class of offerees is not defined, it is difficult to identify
the persons who could have reasonably made any investment decision
vis-a-vis the offer; therefore, the logic of denying standing becomes
stronger.
In the first four situations, the plaintiff transacts business, attempts
to transact business, or wishes to transact business in securities. The
transactions involve the investment decision-making process that Congress sought to protect. The plaintiff is the decision-maker; therefore
the plaintiff should be protected by lob-5 and standing should be allowed.
The last two situations will be the battle field of controversy under
the investor criterion. Those who favor a virtually limitless reach for
10b-5 will argue that these last two situations should result in standing
for the plaintiff. In substance, their argument will be first that the
Supreme Court requires a broad and flexible interpretation of section
10(b) and 10b-5 75 and that cases like Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations,Inc. v. Camp7 6 have liberalized standing requirements. However, Data Processing and the related standing cases do
not apply to the 10b-5 situations.7" The broad and flexible construction concept must be balanced against the traditional requirements of
judicial self-restraint.78 While the Supreme Court wishes the lower
courts to adhere to congressional purpose by giving the benefit of the
doubt to a victim rather than a defrauder, it does not follow that the
lower courts should ignore the congressional decision to protect only
investors.
CONCLUSION

This note developed a functional interpretation of the statutory
standing criteria for litigation between private parties under 10b-5.
Standing will be given to investors - persons who make, attempt to
make, or wish to make investment decisions in a securities transaction.
This interpretation leaves to the states their traditional powers to
regulate corporate management 79 and preserves the tradition of judicial
74. This is the situation presented in Mount Clemens Indus.,'Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d
339 (9th Cir. 1972).
75. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).

76. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
77. See notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
78. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.

79. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).

"We
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self-restraint in the determination of standing questions. 80
A transaction-investor standard of standing determines standing
not on the merits of the plaintiff's case, but on the neutral principles
discernible from the position of the plaintiff vis-a-vis the investment de-

cision-making process."' At the same time, the standard tends to eliminate plaintiffs with unprovable claims.82 The transaction concept provides an element of flexibility, 3 and the decision-making approach provides some certainty. Finally, the lessons of the Birnbaum experience
are not ignored.
C. CLINTON STRETCH

Tax-Only God Knows For Sure But the I.R.S. Makes a Good
Guess-Use of the Treasury Department's Actuarial Tables
An individual's life expectancy determines, in many tax situations,
the number of tax dollars the federal government will receive. Consequently, the method used to measure this expectancy is extremely important to both the Internal Revenue Service and the taxpayer. However, the courts disagree' on whether this valuation should be based
upon actual expectancy or actuarial expectancy.'
agree that Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute
no more than internal corporate mismanagement." Id. at 12.
80. See notes 55 & 78 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 4 supra.
82. This was the concern of the court in Manor Drug; see note 21 supra.
83. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
1. Compare Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d 116 (5th
Cir. 1971), with Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 32 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 6235 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
2. "Actual expectancy" involves consideration of all facts pertinent to an individual's state of health. "Actuarial expectancy" is determined by extensive averaging
of the population as a whole and does not consider the state of health of the specific
individual in question.
The statutory foundation for the actuarial tables is INT. REV. CODE Op 1954,
§ 7805(a), which authorizes the issuance of "all needful rules and regulations" for the
enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code. These tables are used by the Internal Revenue Service for a variety of tax purposes in valuing annuities, life estates, remainders
and reversions. Some of these purposes are: (a) Valuation of general life estates with
remainer interests to others; (b) Valuation of life annuities [But see ABA, Memorandum of Feb. 11, 1974 (Proposal C) concerning changes in section 72(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code]; (c) Valuation of income interests in funds for terms for years; (d) Valuation of annuity interests for terms for years; (e) Valuation in corporation-stockholder
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In Merchants National Bank v. United States3 a federal district
court recently held that actuarial tables could not be used conclusively
in valuing a life estate for purposes of the estate tax credit under section 2013 of the estate and gift tax provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.4 The case involved an action for a partial refund of estate taxes
paid by plaintiff, the executor of decedent's estate. Plaintiff had
earlier failed to take a section 2013 credit for the tax paid on prior
transfers to the decedent by the estate of her brother, who died eight
months prior to decedent. The plaintiff argued that the value of decedent's life interest for purposes of the credit should be determined
solely from the applicable actuarial tables.5 However, Merchants National reversed its earlier memorandum decision6 and held that "actuarial tables are not the exclusive factor to be used in valuing life estates, but that other factors tending to show a shorter or longer life expectancy, if they have probative value, may be considered also.'"' The
decision thus reduces the tables to mere evidentiary status. Although
the court believed that the exclusive use of the actuarial tables was the
better practice, it stated that "the weight of authority is definitely to the
contrary."" "The court's acquiescence in outside authority is unfortunate, for there are strong arguments supporting its belief that the actuarial tables should be used exclusively.
Merchants National relied on Miami Beach First NationalBank v.
United States,9 Estate of Lion v. Commissioner0 and Revenue Ruling
66-307." Miami involved the valuation of a charitable remainder interest via determination of the life expectancy of decedent's widow who
annuity agreements; (f) Valuation in income tax charitable contribution deductions, INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170, estate tax charitable deductions, id. § 2055(e) (2) (A), and
gift tax charitable deductions (id. § 2522(c) (2) (A)) for remainder interests placed in
trust.
3. P-H 1973 FED. TAxEs, EsT. & GFT (33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d) 1 147,870
(D. Kan. June 26, 1973).
4. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2013 provides:
(a) GENERAL RuLE.-The tax imposed by section 2001 shall be credited with

all or part of the amount of the Federal estate tax paid with respect to the
transfer of property (including property passing as a result of the exercise or

non-exercise of a power of appointment) to the decedent by or from a person
(herein designated as a "transferor") who died within 10 years before, or
within 2 years after, the decedent's death....
5. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f), table I (1958).
6. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1446 (D. Kan.
1973).
7. P-H 1973 FED. TA ES, ET. & GIFT at 149, 336.
8. Id.
9. 443 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971).
10. 438 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1971).
11. 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 429,
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was afflicted with a number of serious medical conditions at the time
of her husband's death. The court spoke of the "presumptive correctness" of the actuarial tables, but concluded that sufficient evidence
regarding the actual life expectancy could overcome this presumption. 2
However, the court held that in this case the actuarial tables should be
used exclusively, because testimony concerning the widow's actual life
expectancy was highly speculative and therefore insufficient to overcome
the presumption.
In setting forth its general test of "presumptive correctness", the
court noted that the Treasury Regulations also anticipate this approach
in section 20.2031-1 (b), which provides in part that "[a]ll relevant facts
and elements of value as of the applicable valuation date shall be considered in every case."' 3 This argument seems very tenuous, however,
since this regulation is merely the general valuation section for gross
estates. Section 20.2031-7, on the other hand, specifically concerns
valuation of life expectancy, and such calculations are based on the
tables set forth in this latter section. Arguably, this section takes precedence over the more general section on valuation of gross estates.' 4
In Estate of Lion, the other case relied on by Merchants National,
the issue was whether an estate tax credit' 5 should be allowed for property previously subjected to estate tax. The credit was claimed for
a life estate in a residuary trust created by decedent's husband with
whom she died in a common accident. The court did not allow the
credit, holding that the value of Mrs. Lion's life estate at the time of
the transfer was zero and that the actuarial tables would not be applied
"where there is reasonable certainty that use of the tables would violate
reason and fact."'" The court concluded that it would be unreasonable
to value Mrs. Lion's life interest by use of the tables' 7 since a hypothet12. 443 F.2d at 119.
13. Id. at 119-20, quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1.
14. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. United States, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1446, 1447 (D.
Kan. 1973).
15. IrT. REv. CODEOF 1954, § 2013.
16. 438 F.2d at 61; see Estate of Hoelzel, 28 T.C. 384 (1957); Estate of Butler,
18 T.C. 914 (1952); Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760 (1949); Estate of Nellie H.
Jennings, 10 T.C. 323 (1948).
17. The court also used language in the regulations to sustain its decision that strict
use of the tables is not required:
That the tables may or may not reflect "recognized valuation principles" is im- ..
rather than an
plicit in the use of the phrase "see especially § 2031-7" .
imperative phrase, for example, "as determined by § 20.2031-7," or an expression of like import. The regulations thus leave room for departure from
strict application of the tables.
438 F.2d at 60.
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ical buyer would have paid nothing for her "interest" at the time of

the transfer."' Estate of Lion therefore provides strong precedent for
selective use of the regulation tables."
Finally, Revenue Ruling 66-307 states that outside evidence will
be allowed for valuing life and remainder interests for purposes of
computing the allowable credit for tax on prior transfers, when the
death of a life tenant from. known causes is predictable and imminent
on the valuation date.20 Although the court in Merchants National,
an opinion written by Judge Templar, upheld this ruling, it had been
invalidated a few days earlier by a district court in Continental Bank
& Trust v. United States21 as being in direct conflict with the regulations. Continental demanded strict use of the tables even though the
decedent-life tenant was seventy-five years old and suffering from incurable cancer and even though medical testimony estimated her life

expectancy to be less than six months at the time of the transfer.2
Ironically, Continental cited the earlier memorandum decision of Merchants National as authority for requiring exclusive use of the Treasury

tables.23

Evidently, Judge Templar was not aware that his earlier

memorandum decision had gained support when he reversed himself
and withdrew the earlier opinion.2 4
There are substantial arguments supporting Judge Templar's earlier

memorandum decision. For example, the justification often given for
favoring actual expectancy over actuarial expectancy is the unreliability of actuarial tables as valuation devices per se, without regard
to policy considerations. Generally, these doubts have been rejected
18. Id. at 62. Although it may seem unreasonable to use the actuarial tables in
"simultaneous death" cases, the court's hypothetical buyer test is an equally imperfect
method of valuation, which is deficient when applied in other situations. A hypothetical
buyer would pay little or nothing for the life estate of a person with an incurable disease.
Nevertheless, the person could possibly live for a long time and the value to him might
therefore be much greater than the market value.
19. "Where at the time of the transferor's death it was unmistakable to one in possession of the facts that the transferee's life would be radically shorter than predicted
in the actuarial tables, the value of a transferred life estate may be reduced accordingly
for purposes of calculating the tax credit under § 2013." Id.
20. The ruling refers to the principle of Nellie H. Jennings, 10 T.C. 323 (1948)
and also cites Estate of Nicholas Murray Butler, 18 T.C. 914 (1952), acquiesced in,
1953-1 CuM. BuLL. 3; Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760 (1949), acquiesced in in
part, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 3; Estate of John Halliday Denbigh, 7 T.C. 387 (1946),
acquiesced in, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 4.
21. 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6235 (N.D. Il. 1973).
22. Continentalinvolved the tax credit under section 2013.
23. 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 6236.
24. The cases were decided fourteen days apart. In light of Continental, Judge
Templar could conceivably return to his earlier decision when the opportunity arises.
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by the courts 5 except in cases in which there are unusual circumstances.2 Arguably, the tables should be applied conclusively under all
circumstances. As evaluation devices the actuarial tables are "broadly
equitable12 7 tools for both the taxpayer and the Service. Courts have
said that "the United States is in business with enough different taxpayers so that the law of averages has ample opportunity to work." 2
Consequently, in the long run all parties benefit from strict use of the
tables; unreasonable results from the government's point of view even
out, and extremely harsh results for the taxpayer 29 have been softened
by new Code sections.3 0
Valuation of life expectancy under any method is at best imprecise; thus, a method that is systematically applied has a quality of certainty that is advantageous for many reasons, administrative convenience being one of the most important. As Justice Holmes stated in
a Supreme Court case dealing with actuarial tables: "[Value] as the
word is used by the law . . . depends largely on more or less certain
prophecies of the future; and the value is no less real at that time if
later the prophecy turns out false than when it comes out true. '3 1 The
tables provided by regulations necessarily deal with probabilities, but
they apply indiscriminately to all individuals and incorporate in their
statistics the possibility of premature death as well as longevity. 32
Systematic application of the tables for valuation will consequently save
much time, preclude spurious arguments by both the Service and the
taxpayer,33 and relieve the courts of the burden of calculating imponderables. Moreover, the courts have emphasized the desirability of
using the tables in uncertain and speculative situations in order to avoid
unnecessary complexity and confusion. 4
25. 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 7.07, at 416
(1959).
26. See Rev. Rul. 66-307, 1966-2 CuM. BuLL. 429.
27. Estate of Irma E. Green, 22 T.C. 728, 732 (1954).
28. Rosen v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1968); Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 552 (2d Cir. 1962).
29. See Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929).
30. E.g., INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 2013 (tax credit for prior transfers).
31. 279 U.S. at 155.
32. See Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d 116, 120 (5th
Cir. 1971).
33. See Palfrey v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 153 (D. Mass. 1940) in which the
taxpayer argued that "the beneficiaries of this life estate were of such a type, that is,
people independently wealthy and without business cares or worries, that it was reasonably certain that they would live longer than the term of years allotted to them by
the tables]." Id. at 156.
34. See Chauncery Stillman, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 478 (1965); Estate of Irma
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The Miami court stated that even though there are some discrepancies in the tables which may prove unfortunate for individual taxpayers, these discrepancies may have to be suffered in the interest of a
simplified overall administration of the tax laws.3 5 This argument
cuts both ways, however, and the government should accept its share
of unfortunate tax results because of use of the tables. Nevertheless,
courts have generally allowed the "presumptive correctness" of the tables
to be rebutted only in favor of the Commissioner, as seen in Miami
and Merchants National, where the government argued inconsistently
in the two cases and won in both. Strict use of the tables at least would
place the cost of administrative convenience on both parties equally,
even though the government can more easily bear the burden.
In the earlier memorandum decision of Merchants National the
court developed an ingenious actuarial argument for the exclusive use
of the regulation tables:
If the tables were not determinative in arriving at the value
of a life estate, and the IRS were allowed to prove the probability
of death at a date prior to that used in the actuarial tables, then,
of course, the tables would need to be revised to take these people
out of the sample, because the life expectancy of people in
good health would rise when not considered along with the people
in bad health. If it were accepted, as defendant [IRS] suggests,
that the presumptive correctness of the actuarial tables are overcome where extrinsic evidence shows ill health and a probability
of early death, then the presumptive correctness would be overcome in all cases where this could not be shown also, because
the tables include consideration of sickly people.8 6
The only rebuttal to such an argument is that the persons who come
within the purview of Revenue Ruling 66-307 are so few that they have
a negligible effect on the actuarial factors in the table-a position that
might be difficult to uphold.
Another argument for the conclusive and systematic application
of the actuarial tables might be termed "the maintenance of the court's
integrity." Consider the following hypothetical: X devises certain
property to a charity with an intervening life estate in favor of his son Y
who has an incurable disease. At X's death his executor argues that
the tables are unrealistic because of Ys condition (the lower the value
of Y's life interest, the greater the charitable deduction allowed), but
E. Green, 22 T.C. 728 (1954); cf. McMurty v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 659 (1st Cir.
1953).
35. 443 F.2d at 119.
36. 31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d at 1447.
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the Commissioner argues that the tables should be conclusive of Y's
life expectancy. Y dies shortly after his father and his executor (who
may be the same as was his father's) applies for the tax credit for prior
transfers. Here the executor argues that the tables should be conclusive of Y's life expectancy at the time of the prior transfer (the
greater the value of the life interest, the more credit allowed). The
Commissioner now argues, however, that actual expectancy should
be used to value the interest, because use of the tables would cause
unreasonable results. Some courts have stressed that the tables affect
an averaging of results and that the Commissioner "may not switch
back and forth for the sake of revenue."' 7 Strict utilization of the
regulation tables would prevent such insults to the courts' integrity.
Most of the arguments against exclusive use of actuarial tables
arose when the old actuarial tables were in effect. 38 These tables assumed an interest factor of three and one-half percent per year and
were based on mortality figures derived from the 1939-1941 census. 39
Since they were based on outmoded assumptions and data, the tables
were quickly recognized as inadequate;40 it was generally felt tha they
should not be used exclusively in all cases. Several courts rejected the
tables because the assumed rate of interest was unrealistic, 41 but even
these cases required an extreme discrepancy to overcome the presumption
in favor of the tables.
New tables are presently in effect for transactions occurring after
December 31, 1970 for valuation of annuities, life estates, terms for
years, remainders and reversions. 42 These tables are based on actuarial data supplied by the 1959-1961 census and assume a six percent interest rate, compounded annually. Therefore, many of the arguments against exclusive use of actuarial tables that pertained to the
antiquated 1952 tables are no longer cogent. In addition to increased
life expectancy figures and interest rates, the new tables provide separate
male and female listings, recognizing the actuarial fact that women
normally outlive men. Commentators contend that the revised Regu37. Rosen v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1968).
38. The old tables cover transactions effected between 1952 and December 30,
1970.
39. Lyon, The Effect on Estate Planning of the New Valuation Tables for Life
Estates,Etc. N.Y.U. 30rn INST. ON FED. TAX 669, 670 (1972).
40. Id. at 671.
41. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 13 T.C. 760 (1949); Security-First Nat'l Bank, 35
B.T.A. 815 (1937).
42. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-10(f) (1958).
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lations should bring about acceptance of actuarial tables by both the
courts and the taxpayers.43
The courts and the Service have already agreed to apply conclusively the actuarial tables to code sections 2037 (a) (2), regarding transfers taking effect at death, and 2042(2), regarding the possibility of a reversion interest in life insurance proceeds. Revenue Ruling 66-307, which promulgates nonconclusive use of the tables for
section 2013, specifically excepts sections 2037 and 2042 from its
purview:
However, it [principle of valuation allowing evidence outside the tables] may not be applied in computing the value of a
decedent's reversionary interest for the purpose of sections 2037(b)
and 2042(2) of the code. In these sections Congress has provided a rule of administrative convenience which requires the
facts of the deapplication of actuarial tables notwithstanding the
44
cedent's death or the facts surrounding his death.
The theory supporting strict use of the actuarial tables in these
sections was discussed by the Tax Court in Estate of Dwight B. Roy,
Jr.4 5 The court pointed to the five percent "trigger" factor40 in sections

2037 and 2042 as evidence of a legislative mandate that the calculation of value for these sections be mechanical and that the use of the
tables be exclusive. 47 This theory is apparently based on the court's
belief that the five percent factor was an arbitrary figure chosen by
the legislature. However, the court may have been concerned with
more than legislative intent when this decision was reached. If strict
use of the tables were not applied to these sections, both the taxpayer
and the Commissioner would plague the court with evidence seeking
to vary the life expectancy from that reported in the table, either to
trigger or to avoid triggering the five percent factor. And in these
sections a few years difference in life expectancy could be crucial, for,
once the five percent level is reached, there is a full inclusion-not just
a five percent inclusion.
43. Lyon, supra note 39, at 692. Of course, if the courts adopt strict use of the
tables in all tax situations, it would be imperative that the tables be periodically updated
to recognize realistic figures for both life expectancy and interest rate. The gain realized
from administrative convenience alone should justify the cost of keeping the tables in
line with current values.
44. 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 430.
45. 54 T.C. 1317 (1970).
46. These sections are "triggered," Le. cause an inclusion in the gross estate, whenever a decedent's interest value reaches 5% of the total value of the property in question.
There is then a full inclusion of the property and not just a 5% inclusion.
47. 54 T.C. at 1323.
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Finally, the Merchants National decision has an impact upon estate tax planning. When the planner cannot rely exclusively on the
actuarial tables, his client's ultimate tax liability is unnecessarily specuAn example of the planning ramifications of the method
lative.4
used for valuation can be seen in the establishment of a private annuity agreement. Whether the actuarial tables will be strictly used
is very important for the estate planning of the transferor. The estate and gift tax advantages of the annuity agreement may be preserved
only if the present value of the annuity promise equals the fair market value of the property at the time of the transfer. 49 Only by relying
on the tables can the planner ascertain such present value with certainty. If property worth 100,000 dollars is transferred in exchange
for an annuity promise worth 50,000 dollars, a potentially taxable gift
of 50,000 dollars has been made. Consequently, it is important for
the planner to know how the 'Commissioner will determine present
value. Likewise, a planner cannot satisfactorily advise a client concerning disposition to a disabled relative if he cannot rely on the conclusiveness of the Regulation tables.
Hopefully, the courts will transpose the presumptive correctness
of the Treasury's actuarial tables into a conclusive presumption of
law. In light of the administrative convenience that would be fostered, the reliability of the new tables and the boon to estate planning
that would result, the courts have ample reasons to do so.
HUGH F. OATES, JR.

Uniform Commercial Code-§ 2-702: Conflict with § 67c(1)(A)
of the Federal Bankruptcy Act
In the recent case of In re Federal's, Inc.1 the question of
whether section 2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code creates
a statutory lien that is invalid against the trustee in bankruptcy was before the court. Section 2-702(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code per48. Estate tax liability is always indefinite at the planning stage. But, if the tables
may be relied upon conclusively, the planner at least has an idea of the outer limits of
tax liability.
49. Lyon, supra note 39, at 677.
1. 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
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mits the seller of goods on credit to reclaim such goods from the buyer "upon demand made within ten days after the receipt" when the seller "discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent." The Bankruptcy Act in section 67c(1)(A) 2 declares invalid,
against the trustee in bankruptcy, "every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of the debtor." Traditionally, the
law of contracts in most states permitted rescission by a party who was
induced to enter into a contract by a fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation. When property had been transferred pursuant to a contract
fraudulently induced, the defrauded party was entitled to restoration
if no innocent party had acquired an interest in it.3 This right of reclamation by the defrauded seller has been recognized in bankruptcy since
only the defeasible title of the bankrupt passes to the trustee. Thus
the issue raised by In re Federal's, Inc. was whether section 2-702(2)
of the Code is merely a statutory definition of the seller's common law
right of rescission for fraud or whether that section grants such seller
a statutory lien.
On August 10, 1972 Panasonic, Inc. sold and delivered to Federal's, Inc. certain electronic equipment. On August 16, 1972 Federal's
filed a petition for arrangement pursuant to chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, and subsequently a receiver was appointed to operate the
business. On August 18, 1972, within ten days of Federal's receipt of
the goods, Panasonic demanded their return.
Panasonic's petition for reclamation was heard before the Referee
in Bankrutpcy for the Eastern District of Michigan. At the trial Panasonic conceded that Federal's intended to pay for the merchandise ordered and received.5 The court determined that under section 2-702
(2) Panasonic had the right to reclaim the equipment from Federal's. 0
2. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1) (A) (1970).
3. 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.41, at 483 (14th ed. 1973).
4. Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631 (1876).
5. 12 UCC Rep. Serv. at 1144.
6. Id. at 1150. The finding that Panasonic had the right to reclaim from the
trustee was reached in a circuitous manner: In Michigan, MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.2702
(3) (1964), provides that "fthe seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject
to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor
under this Article." In section 9-301(3) the Code defines a "lien creditor" as including
a trustee in bankruptcy. The rights of a trustee in bankruptcy as against a reclaiming
seller are not defined in the Article on sales. Therefore, a dispute arose over the meaning of the words "subject to the rights of [a] lien creditor under this Article." The
court in In re Federal's followed the precedent established in In re Mel Golde Shoes,
Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968) in holding that, since the Code itself did not define
the relative rights of the trustee and the reclaiming seller, the court must look to nonCode, Michigan common law to define these rights. Under Michigan common law, the
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The court found, however, that this right to reclaim was a statutory
lien, and, because the right arose only on the insolvency of the debtor,
it was invalid against the trustee under section 67c(1)(A) of the Bank7
ruptcy Act.
The Bankruptcy Act provides little guidance in defining "statutory
lien." Although the Act defines the term, this definition merely distinguishes a statutory lien from a consensual lien.8 Nevertheless, the Act
does provide two standards for testing the validity of a statutory lien
against the trustee in bankruptcy: first, does the lien arise apart from
the insolvency of the debtor, and secondly, is the lien perfected or
enforceable against a bona fide purchaser? If both questions are answered affirmatively, the lien will be valid against the trustee. 9 Statutory liens arising only on insolvency are invalidated by the present Act
defrauded seller prevailed over the trustee in bankruptcy; therefore, the court reasoned,
under section 2-702 the reclaiming seller must prevail. Since the court found that section 2-702 created an invalid statutory lien, however, this section was not applied by
the court. Under Michigan common law the seller was required to prove the buyer's
lack of intent to pay in order to establish fraud. Panasonic therefore did not prevail.
Many commentators objected strenuously to the approach taken in cases holding
that the relative rights of the reclaiming seller and the trustee must be defined by reference to non-Code law. Those commentators felt that since the relative rights of the
trustee and reclaiming seller were not defined in the Code, the words "subject to the
rights of a . . . lien creditor under this Article" should be given their literal meaning
and the trustee should prevail. See, e.g., Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in
Bankruptcy, 1 NEw Max. L. REv. 435, 457 (1971); Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed
Amendment of the UCC Section 2-702(3): Another View of Lien Creditors Rights vs.
Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 93 (1962).
Because of the controversy which arose as to the meaning of the words "subject
to the rights of a . . . lien creditor," the 1966 amendments to the official text of sectUon 2-702 deleted these words. Like Michigan, however, many states still retain the
original wording. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-2-702(3) (1973); IowA CoDE ANN.
§ 554.2702(3) (1967); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-702(3) (1958).
7. 12 UCC Rep. Serv. at 1152.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a) (1970) defines "statutory lien" as follows:
Statutory lien shall mean a lien arising solely by force of statute upon
specified circumstances or conditions, but shall not include any lien provided
by or dependent upon an agreement to give security, whether or not such lien
is also provided by or is also dependent upon statute and whether or not the
agreement or lien is made fully effective by statute.
The Senate Report on this section indicates that its purpose is "to assure that consensual
securities are not subjected to any of the tests of validity prescribed by the new 67(c)."
S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966).
9. 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1970). A different test for determining the
validity of a statutory lien on personal property was employed in section 67(c) of the
1952 Bankruptcy Act. That section asked whether the lien was accompanied by possession of, levy upon, sequestration of or distraint of the property. If not, the lien would
be invalid against the trustee. Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 21(d), 66 Stat. 420, 42728. The Senate Report on 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1970) points out the reason for the
alteration: "Some liens which are genuine property rights are affected [by the standard
of possession] and others which were essentially state created priorities escape." S. RaP.
No. 1159, supra note 8, at 6.
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because they were felt to be nothing more than disguised priorities constituting an invalid attempt by the state to determine the order of dis-

tribution on insolvency. 10
Whether a lien exists within the meaning of the Bankuptcy Act is

ordinarily said to be determined by reference to state law."1 However,
since the substance of the right created by the state rather than its form
is the concern of the Bankruptcy Act, a court will occasionally be compelled to determine the nature of the right created regardless of the
label attached by the state.'12

Therefore, the determinative issue pre-

sented by In re Federal's, Inc. is whether in substance the right created
by section 2-702 is a lien (as it has been traditionally defined by state
law) or a statutorily created right of rescission for fraud.
The word "lien" is given a variety of definitions by state cases, but
is generally recognized as a "hold which one person, the creditor or
lienor, has upon the property of another, the debtor, as security for the
performance by the latter of some duty or obligation owed to the for-

mer.' 3 "Lien" is usually defined as a means of collecting a debt, or
as security for a debt, rather than as a property interest. 14
Since the debt is the point of reference for most state created lien
rights, the creditor may normally sell the property subject to the lien
to satisfy the indebtedness and in addition may claim any deficiency

from the debtor as an unsecured creditor. 15 The right of a lien creditor
to collect a deficiency judgment is recognized in bankruptcy by section
10. S. REP. No. 1159, supra note 8, at 7.
11. E.g., City of New York v. Hall, 139 F.2d 935, 936 (2d Cir. 1944); Commercial Credit Co. v. Davidson, 112 F.2d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1940).
12. See Halpert v. Industrial Comm'r, 147 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1945); Strom
v. Peikes, 123 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1941); In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, 621
(W.D. La. 1968), affd, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 930 (1969); Note, Vacation in Bankruptcy of Statutory Wage Earners' Priorities
Establishedin Previous State Insolvency Proceedings,51 YALE L.J. 863, 866 (1942).
13. R. BRowN, Tim LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 505 (2d ed. 1955).
14. See, e.g., Springer v. J.R. Clark Co., 138 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1943) ("A
lien is distinguished from an assignment in that it is a charge upon property, while an
assignment creates an interest in property."); Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F.
287, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (A lien is a lienor's "right to take his debt out of some specified res."); Page v. Francis, 196 Ark. 822, 826, 120 S.W.2d 161, 164 (1938) ("A lien
gives the creditor the right to enforce his claim against specific property."); Hurley v.
Boston R.R. Holding Co., 315 Mass. 591, 608, 54 N.E.2d 183, 193 (1944) ("A lien is
ordinarily security for a 'debt, duty or other obligation."); J.T. Evans Co. v. Fanelli,
59 NJ. Super. 19, 23, 157 A.2d 36, 38 (Super. Ct. 1959) (A lien is "generally
recognized as a charge upon a particular piece of property. . . for the payment or discharge of a particular debt or duty."); Frick & Co. v. Hilliard, 95 N.C. 117, 122 (1886)
("A lien is a right by which a person is entitled to obtain satisfaction of a debt, by
means of property belonging to the person indebted to him.").
15. 4A W. COLLiER, supra note 3, 170.41, at 492-93.
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57h of the Bankruptcy Act.' 6 This section allows the secured creditor
to participate as a general creditor in the distribution of the bankrupt's
assets for the difference between the value of his security and the
7
amount of his claim.1
The statutory lien is of a different origin than other types of liens:
consensual, equitable or common law. Yet, normally the rights confered by a statutory lien coincide with those rights accompanying liens
in general' s because a statutory lien is "a lien created by statute."'19
The statutory lien evolved from the common law possessory lien that
permitted the furnisher of services to retain possession of his customer's
goods to secure payment for those services.20 During the nineteenth
century the common law possessory lien was gradually defined by statute. As a result, statutes in most states now provide liens in favor of
various service industries that are, or at one time were, important to
the local economy. 2 1- These liens are given to certain classes of individuals upon the rendition of their services or upon the furnishing of other
valuable consideration.2 2 Section 2-702 satisfies the criterion that a
statutory lien is a lien given by statute to a certain class of individuals
(in this case, the seller of goods) upon the furnishing of valuable consideration (in this case, the goods delivered on credit to the insolvent
buyer).
Such analysis is incomplete, however, and the critical question remains-is the section 2-702 right in substance a lien? In order to ananswer this question, it must first be ascertained whether the Code itself contemplates the creation of a lien in section 2-702. As was shown
earlier, a lien has been defined generally as security for a debt.2 3 The
definition of "security interest" in section 1-201(37) of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation") is sufficiently analogous to the common law definitions of a lien to suggest that a lien
16. 11 U.S.C. § 93(h) (1970).
17. Id. provides in pertinent part: "The value of securities held by secured creditors shall be determined by converting the same into money . . . and the amount of
such value shall be credited upon such claims, and a dividend shall be paid only on the
unpaid balance."
18. See definitions in note 14 supra.
19. 53 CJ.S. Liens § 1 (1948).
20. 2 G. GIMoRE, SECURITY INTERE Ts IN PERsONAL PRoPERTY § 33.2, at 873
(1965).
21. Id. at 874.
22. 4 W. COLLiER, supra note 3,
67.20, at 214; see In re Tele-Tone Radio
Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739, 747 (D.N.J. 1955).
23. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
0

174

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

would be a "security interest" under the Code. Most of the cases and
commentators, however, are in agreement that the right created by section 2-702 is not a "security interest" under the Code 2 4 and, therefore,
arguably not a lien.
The reasoning usually given for this conclusion is that section 9-203
of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that a security interest arising under the Code is only enforceable against the debtor or a third
party if the collateral is in the possession of the secured party or if the
debtor has signed a security agreement. This general rule is subject
only to the exception provided by section 9-113 for security interests
arising under the article on sales. Section 9-113 provides that such
a security interest is enforceable without a signed security agreement
if the debtor "does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of
the goods." Applying these sections to the right created by section 2702 reveals that a security interest within the meaning of the Code is
not created by that section.
First, section 2-702 gives the seller a right to reclaim goods that
are no longer in his possession. In addition, this section clearly indicates that the seller's right to reclaim is enforceable against the debtor
without a signed security agreement because section 2-702 applies only
to sellers of goods "on credit." Thus under the criterion established by
section 9-203 this right of reclamation will be a security interest only
if the exception provided by section 9-113 is applicable.
Arguably, a buyer who obtains goods on credit while insolvent does
not "lawfully obtain possession" of these goods and, therefore, a security interest requiring no security agreement is created. The official
comment to section 2-702, however, states that "any receipt of goods
on credit by an insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore is fraudulent as against the particular
seller." 25 Since the buyer's fraudulent misrepresentation of solvency
has traditionally rendered the contract voidable rather than void, the
24. In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968); Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniform Commercial Code: Massachusetts
Variety, 38 B.U.L. Rtv. 571, 579 (1958); Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy
Act Amendments of 1966, 42 WASH. L. REV. 681, 719 (1967); Note, Bankruptcy and
Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code: The Right to Recover the Goods upon
Insolvency, 79 HARv. L. REv. 598 (1966); Comment, Selected Priority Problems in Secured Financing under the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 YALE L.J 751, 757 (1959);
cf. Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 251 Ore. 20, 36 n.11, 444 P.2d 564, 572 n.11
(1968). But see Countryman, supra note 6, at 455-58.
25. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702, Comment 2.

19741

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

175

seller is given the option to rescind the contract.2 6 The proposition that
the buyer does not lawfully obtain possession under these circumstances is difficult to support. Moreover, the official comment to section 9-113 makes no reference to section 2-702, but rather refers to
sections 2-703, 2-705 and 2-706 as instances in which the buyer does
not have or lawfully obtain possession of the goods.17 Each of these
sections gives the seller rights with respect to goods that are still in his
possession or goods that have not yet reached the buyer. Clearly,
therefore, the dispensation created by section 9-113 does not apply to
section 2-702 and the right created by section 2-702 is not a "security
interest" within the meaning of the Code.
However, because the substance of the right rather than its form
is the concern of the Bankruptcy Act, 28 a determination must be made
of whether the right created by the Uniform Commercial Code in section 2-702 will be construed to be a lien even though it is not labeled
a "security interest" by the Code. It has been asserted that under section 2-702 a seller on credit "is given the same rights that a secured
creditor would have, namely, the right to repossess the goods. 2 0 Under this reasoning the section 2-702 right would be in substance a lien
and, therefore, invalid against the trustee. This was the conclusion
reached by the court in Federal's.
Upon close examination, however, the seller's right of reclamation
under section 2-702 differs significantly from a traditional lien. The
seller under section 2-702 has a right to reclaim his property rather than
a right to satisfy his debt out of this property. Thus, section 2-702 states
that the seller "may reclaim the goods upon demand. 30 When the
seller reclaims goods under section 2-702(2), he forfeits all other remedies with respect to those goods, particularly the right to recover
the difference between the resale price and the contract price. 31 Thus
26. 3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAw GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND
UNDER THE UNFoRM SALES Acr §§ 647-48 (rev. ed. 1948).
27. Section 2-705 of the Uniform Commercial Code gives the seller of goods the
right to stop goods in transit when he discovers the buyer to be insolvent. It is interesting that the predecessor to section 2-705, sections 53 and 57 of the Uniform Sales Act,
referred to the right of a seller to stop goods in transit upon discovery of insolvency
as a "lien."
28. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
29. In re Hardin, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 857, 862 (E.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d
938 (7th Cir. 1972).
30. Emphasis added. See definitions of "lien" in notes 13-14 and accompanying
text supra.
31. 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 3,
70.41, at 492-93. Compare UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702(3), with id. § 2-706(1).
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section 2-702 withholds from the reclaiming seller one important right
of the traditional lienor: the right to claim a deficiency judgment.
Without considering these arguments, the court in In re Federal's,
Inc. held that "[t]he right to reclaim conferred by section 2-702(2)
realistically viewed is a statutory lien. .... 1 Two cases were relied
3
on by the referee in support of his conclusion. First, in In re Trahan"
the court held that the "nature of [the Louisiana vendor's] privilege
...is close to that of a statutory lien"3 4 and that this "privilege cannot
be excluded from definitional coverage under [the Bankruptcy Act]
. . .merely because Article 3227 [of the Louisiana statute] uses the
word 'privilege' instead of 'lien'. . . ." The statute that was the subject of the decision in Trahan provides in pertinent part: "He who sold
to another any movable property, which is not paid for, has a preference
on the price of his property, over the other creditors of the purchaser
")36

This statute differs from section 2-702 in several significant respects. The seller is not given a right to the return of the property
sold, but rather a "preference on the price" of that property. In addition, the word "price" in this statute refers back to the original agreement between buyer and seller, whereas under section 2-702 the buyer,
in reclaiming his property, relinquishes any further right of action
on the contract. Moreover, the Louisiana statute does not forbid a deficiency judgment, and because it refers to "price," any action under
this statute is taken with reference to the original debt.
A similar provision in the Puerto Rico Code was found to be a
statutory lien in In re J. R. Nieves & Co.,37 the second case relied on
in Federal's. The Puerto Rico statute provides the seller with a preferred credit "for the amount of the sale of personal property which
may be in the possession of the debtor to the extent of value of the
same."3 8 The seller's credit for the price of his property is "preferred"
to the extent of the value of this property. This statute does not limit
the seller's remedy to recovery of the goods sold, however, nor to the
"value of the same," and in these respects, differs from section 2-702.
32.
33.
curiam),
34.
35.

12 UCC Rep. Serv. at 1153.
283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1968), aflfd, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968) (per
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
Id. at 623.
Id.
36. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3227 (West 1952).
37. 446 F.2d '188 (1st Cir. 1971).
38. P.R. IAws ANN, tit. 31, § 5192 (1968).
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The above statutes, found by the courts to create statutory liens,

have reference to the original debt and do not forbid deficiency judgments.

The rights created by these statutes are, therefore, closer in

nature to traditional lien remedies than is the right created by section
2-702. Thus, Federal's reliance on these cases seems unwarranted.
Before the court's opinion can be criticized, however, consideration must be given to the further question of whether the 2-702 right

more closely resembles a right of reclamation for fraud, than it does
a statutory lien. The right of rescission and reclamation by the selle-r
for fraud, permitted at common law in most states,

nized in bankruptcy.

9

is generally recog-

This recognition is based either on the theory

that only the defeasible title of the bankrupt passes to 'the trustee" or

on the theory that the bankrupt's other creditors cannot lawfully profit
from the bankrupt's fraud.41 In determining whether the seller is permitted to reclaim the goods in bankruptcy, the primary consideration

is whether the act complained of gives a right to rescission for fraud
42
under state law.
To ascertain what actions on the part of the insolvent buyer wil
constitute fraud and enable the seller to reclaim goods from the insolvent buyer, two standards have been applied by the individual states.
Some states require a showing by the seller of the buyer's actual intent

not to pay at the time of purchase,43 while in others, a showing of an
overt misstatement of financial condition is sufficient.44
39. 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 3, f 70.41, at 483; S. WLLisT N, supra note 26,
§§ 647-48.
40. Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631 (1876).
41. In re Stridacchio, 107 F. Supp. 486, 487 (D.N.J. 1952).
42. 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 3, 70.41, at 484; see, e.g., United Constr. Co.
v. Milam, 124 F.2d 670, 672 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 642 (1942); Elbro
Knitting Mills v. Schwartz, 30 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1929); Schroth v. Monarch Fence
Co., 229 F. 549, 551 (6th Cir. 1916); In re Woerderhoff Shoe Co., 184 F. Supp. 479,
482 (N.D. Iowa 1960), aff'd sub nom. O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d
1 (8th Cir. 1961); In re Perelstine, 19 F.2d 408, 410 (W.D. Pa. 1927).
43. E.g., Donaldson v. Farwell, 93 U.S. 631 (1876); United Constr. Co. v. Milam,
124 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 642 (1942); In re General Lumber
Prods. Co., 21 F.2d 979 (D. Md. 1927); John Heidsik Co. v. Rechter, 291 Mich. 708,
289 N.W. 304 (1939).
44. E.g., In re Weissman, 19 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1927) (buyer submitted a false
financial statement to a credit agency); In re Monson, 127 F. Supp. 625 (W.D. Ky.
1955) (false financial statement); In re Flayton, 39 F. Supp. 774 (E.D.N.Y. 1941)
(bankrupt told buyer he would pay promptly); In re Perelstine, 19 F.2d 408 (W.D. Pa.
1927) (false financial statement); Mulroney Mfg. Co. v. Weeks, 185 Iowa 714, 171
N.W. 36 (1919) (delivery of an N.S.F. check). For cases holding that either a false
representation of financial condition or a showing of the buyer's intent not to pay is
required to constitute fraud see In re New York Commercial Co., 228 F. 120 (2d Cir.
1915); In re Woerderhoff Shoe Co., 184 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Iowa 1960); In re TateJones & Co., 85 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
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In states applying the actual intent standard; a variety of presumptions are relied on in establishing a lack of intent to pay. Some courts
have created a presumption of a lack of intent in cases in which the
actual fact has a strong tendency to prove the presumed fact. For example, the purchaser's knowledge of his insolvent condition raises either a "persuasive legal presumption '45 or a conclusive presumption",
of a lack of intent to pay. Rebuttable presumptions of fraud have been
created by some courts in cases in which there is a relatively weak probative connection between the actual fact and the presumed lack of intent. For example, purchases made by an insolvent have been held
to be presumptively fraudulent because persons in business are presumed to know the financial condition of their businesses and to intend
the natural consequences of their actions. 47 Still other courts have created conclusive presumptions of fraud in cases in which the actual
fact has a relatively weak tendency to prove the presumed fact. For
example, insolvency at the time of purchase has created a conclusive
presumption of fraud since the owners of the business must have known
of their inability to pay. 48
Regardless of the standard employed, the reclaiming seller in
bankruptcy has the burden of proving fraud, and, unless he meets this
burden, allowing him to reclaim would constitute a voidable preference
under the Bankruptcy Act.4 9 Yet, the creation of a variety of presumptions, including conclusive presumptions, in the various states has
greatly eroded the reclaiming seller's burden of proof.50
Can the seller's right under section 2-702 be regarded as simply
a uniform statutory definition of the type of fraud entitling the seller
to reclaim goods upon the buyer's insolvency?"' The official comment
45. In re Penn Table Co., 26 F. Supp. 887, 889-90 (S.D.W. Va. 1939).
46. Manley v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1928); Gillespie v. J.C. Piles
& Co., 178 F. 886 (8th Cir. 1910); In re Whitewater Lumber Co., 7 F.2d 410 (M.D.
Ala. 1925); In re P.H. Krauss & Co., 2 F.2d 999 (W.D. Tenn. 1924). These cases
and In re Penn Table Co., 26 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.W. Va. 1939), indicated that the purchaser's financial condition was hopeless and that he was aware of this fact. This
knowledge was held to raise a presumption of lack of intent to pay.
47. California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1933); In re
Paper City Mill Supply Co., 28 F.2d 115 (D. Mass. 1928); ci. Gillespie v. 1.C. Piles &
Co., 178 F. 886 (8th Cir. 1910).
48. Sternberg v. American Snuff Co., 69 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1934); In re Indiana
Concrete Pipe Co., 33 F.2d 594, 595 (N.D. Ind. 1929) (dictum); In re Gurvitz, 276
F. 931 (D. Mass. 1921); In re Spahn, 138 F. 819 (N.D. Ga. 1910).
49. National Silver Co. v. Nicholas, 205 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1953); Rochford v.
New York Fruit Auction Corp., 116 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1940).
50. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
51 Some authority exists to the effect that section 2-702 is well in line with traditional remedies for fraud. See In re Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 61 (E.D.
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to section 2-702 in effect indicates that the purpose of this section is
to create such a uniform definition by making the insolvent buyer's misrepresentation of solvency, rather than his lack of intent to pay, the test
for fraud. 2 Since misrepresentation of solvency is the test for fraud
under the Code, in Federal'sPanasonic could easily concede that Federal's intended to pay for the merchandise ordered and received.53
Under section 2-702, however, the reclaiming seller need not
prove actual misrepresentation of solvency. The official comment in
effect indicates that the purpose of section 2-702 is to create a conclusive presumption that receipt of goods on credit while insolvent is
"a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency." 54 Presumptions have
traditionally been accepted to establish fraud in bankruptcy. Receipt
of goods by a hopelessly insolvent buyer has been held to raise a conclusive presumption of lack of intent entitling the seller to reclaim
goods in bankruptcy. 55 , Section 2-702 requires no threshold degree of
insolvency to entitle the seller to reclaim. Since misrepresentation of
solvency may be either overt or covert, however, the probative connection between a buyer's receipt of goods on credit while insolvent and
his misrepresentation of solvency is at least as strong as the probative
connection between hopeless insolvency and lack of intent to pay.
It is clear that the purpose of section 2-702(2) is to replace traditional state remedies of rescission for fraud. The section states that:
"Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right
to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay."'5 6 In re Federal's,Inc., by finding
that section 2-702 creates a statutory lien, rejects the contention that
section 2-702 merely modifies and makes uniform the seller's traditional right of reclamation for fraud.
CONCLUSION
Thus, section 2-702 in effect creates a uniform standard for allowing reclamation for fraud in bankruptcy. The desirability of creating
Tenn. 1970); 4A W. COLLIER, supra note 3,
70.41; Hogan, supra note 24; King,
Reclamation Petition Granted: In Defense of the Defrauded Seller, 44 RFF. J. 81
(1970).
Other authority insists that actual fraud must be proven and that any presumption
created must be rebuttable. Countryman, supra note 6; Note, 79 HARV. L. REV., supra
note 24.
52. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
53. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
54. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
55. See cases cited in note 48 supra.
56. UNIFORM Co1cMERc.AL CODE §

2-702(2).
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such a uniform standard under the Federal Bankruptcy Act cannot be
questioned. The intent of the Bankruptcy Act to prevent state created
priorities must be balanced against the desirability of a uniform standard to determine whether section 2-702 conflicts with the Bankruptcy
Act. If states were allowed to attach the label of fraud to transactions
in no way fraudulent and thus allow a seller to reclaim goods in bankruptcy, such a right of reclamation would be nothing more than a forbidden priority. In accordance with long established practice, however,
it seems permissible to allow some presumptions to be relied on in establishing fraud in bankruptcy.
In determining whether section 2-702 creates a permissible standard for fraud or a forbidden priority the question should be: does the
buyer's receipt of goods on credit while insolvent have a tendency to
prove fraud? The answer to this question seems to be that receipt of
goods on credit while insolvent tends to prove misrepresentation of solvency since those in business can be reasonably presumed to know of
its financial condition. Section 2-702 merely imposes on the insolvent
buyer a duty to disclose his insolvency in good faith with the sanction
that non-disclosure will constitute a covert misrepresentation of solvency, fraudulent as against a seller on credit.
Since receipt of goods on credit while insolvent could reasonably
be termed fraudulent, section 2-702 should be upheld as creating a
much needed uniform standard for fraud in bankruptcy.
DIANNE SEITZ CAUBLE

